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UNCERTAINTY AND THE LAW OF DAMAGES
ELMER J. SCHAEFER*
Frequently a plaintiff claims a loss of future earnings but cannot
prove with certainty just what those earnings would have been in
the absence of his injury. Today the law of damages permits one of
two responses in this situation. Either damages for the loss of future
earnings are excluded entirely on the ground that their amount is
too speculative, or damages are awarded as if the amount of the loss
were certain. The all-or-nothing quality of these damages law al-
ternatives has been the subject of considerable criticism by legal
writers.'
In an economic sense, any opportunity to receive future earnings
has an element of uncertainty which makes that opportunity less
valuable. For the most part, however, courts have not used the tools
of economic and financial analysis developed to analyze the effect
of uncertainty on the value of a stream of earnings. This Article
proposes that a lesser amount of damages be awarded for a plain-
tiff's lost opportunity to receive earnings if that opportunity cannot
be proven to have been a certainty. This proposal would resolve
many of the difficulties presented by the current all-or-nothing di-
lemma. Moreover, the theory expounded in this Article is not with-
out precedent. Some courts have responded to uncertainty by reduc-
ing the amount of damages that otherwise would have been
awarded.
THE THEORY OF DISCOUNTING FOR RISK
A dollar to be paid in the future is worth less than a dollar payable
today.2 Aside from the expected effects of inflation, this is true for
two reasons. First, as long as a positive rate of interest prevails,
money has a time value. One thousand dollars invested today at five
percent interest will yield $1,050 at the end of the year. Logically, a
person given a choice of receiving $1,000 today or $1,000 one year
* B.A., Northwestern University; M.A., J.D., Harvard University. Associate Professor of
Law, College of William & Mary. The author would like to thank Donald Schneiders, one of
the editors of this Review, for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See note 70 infra & accompanying text.
2. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHMELSTEIN, CASES AND MATErmAxS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 34
(1972).
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from now invariably will choose to receive the amount today. The
availability of a positive rate of interest on money that is certain to
be repaid is the result of two forces. People on balance prefer to
consume immediately rather than to wait to do so, and resources
today can be used to make investments in goods which will increase
productivity tomorrow.3 A second reason why a sum of money pay-
able in the future is less valuable than that same sum payable to-
day is that, as a practical matter, the receipt of a future payment
rarely is an absolute certainty.4 In making investment decisions,
most people are risk-averse. Therefore, the present value assigned
to amounts that might have been received in the future should be
discounted to reflect the uncertainty as to whether they would have
been received.'
The process of discounting is merely the reverse of compounding
interest.' A deposit of $614 in a savings account at five percent
interest compounded annually will grow to $1,000 in ten years or,
in other words, the present value of $1,000 payable in ten years
discounted at five percent is $614. Similar discounting calculations
can be done by consulting the appropriate interest tables.7
The choice of a discount rate can make a substantial difference
in the present value assigned to an income stream. Discounted at
five percent, the present value of $1,000 payable in fifteen years is
$481. By comparison, $1,000 payable after the same number of years
but discounted at twenty percent is not even $65. 8 Choosing the
appropriate discount rate, therefore, involves two major considera-
3. Cf. J. HIRSHLIEFER, INVESTMENT, INTEREST, AND CAPITAL 31-34 (1970).
4. BRUDNEY & CMiRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 33.
5. Because of risk-aversion, an uncertain prospect, the returns on which are immediate,
should still be discounted for uncertainty. Cf. note 21 infra.
6. BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 34. The formula for compounding interest is A
= p(l+r)t, where A is the future amount, p is the principle, r is the interest rate, and t is
the number of years.
A
The discounting formula for a single sum is: p = A where p is the present value, A
is the future amount, r is the discount rate, and t is the number of years until the receipt of
A. Id. nY Ar~ where p is the
The discounting formula for an annual income stream is: p = (l+r)t w
t=1
present value, A is the annual income, r is the discount rate, and t is an index used to identify
each time period (year) of the n total number time periods (years). See Lebrenz & Kreidle,
The Present Value of Lost Wages-Explanation and Application, 64 ILL. B. J. 424, 426 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Present Value of Lost Wages].
7. See, e.g., BRUDNEY & CHMELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 35-37. Throughout this Article the
discounted and compounded values have been computed from tables on the above pages.
8. See id.
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tions. First, the rate must reflect the time value of money as mea-
sured by the risk-free rate of interest. If relatively riskless invest-
ments such as United States Treasury obligations are paying four
percent interest, then a future sum of money the payment of which
is guaranteed should be discounted at four percent to compute its
present value. Certain payment of $1,000 in ten years would be
worth $676 today because that amount could be invested safely at
four percent and, after ten years, would yield $1,000. Because risky
future payments are less valuable than certain future payments,
however, the discount rate should be adjusted upward by a "risk
premium" to reflect the risk associated with future payments., In
the previous example, if the prospect of receiving the $1,000 at the
culmination of ten years is somewhat uncertain, the discount rate
should be four percent, plus whatever additional percentage is nec-
essary to reflect that uncertainty. If the risks associated with an
opportunity to receive $1,000 are similar to the risks of a corporate
bond paying six percent interest, the discount rate should be in-
creased accordingly to six percent. The present value of $1,000 paya-
ble in ten years and discounted at six percent is $558, as compared
to $676 if discounted at four percent. Exactly how much the dis-
count rate should be altered to reflect risk is a matter of judgment;
clearly, however, the greater the perceived risk, the higher the dis-
count rate and, consequently, the lower the present value.'0
Several definitions developed for financial analysis can be useful
in finding the present value of an uncertain income stream. Uncer-
tainty as to an income stream may be thought of as implying that
there are a number of possible outcomes for earnings in any year,
some outcomes perhaps more likely to occur than others. What then
9. Because risky future payments are less valuable than certain ones, it is proper to in-
crease the discount rate and thus reduce the present value of a future payment in proportion
to the perceived amount of risk: the greater the risk, the greater the risk premium added to
the discount rate.
10. Adding a risk premium to the discount rate to adjust for uncertainty assumes in effect
that uncertainty is compounded in each successive year at a steady rate. Because this as-
sumption may be false, strict accuracy would call for separate discounting for uncertainty of
each year's expected returns. See Robichek & Myers, Conceptual Problems in the Use of Risk-
Adjusted Discount Rates, 21 J. FINANCE 727, 727-29 (1966). For most damages problems the
assumption that uncertainty increases with each succeeding year is plausible. Using risk-
adjusted discounted rates to allow for uncertainty is computationally simple. Moreover,
selection of a discount rate in calculating damages can be guided by a comparison with rates
assigned in the market to opportunities involving a comparable amount of risk. A body of
precedent as to the principles for selecting a discount rate can be expected to develop.
1978]
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does it mean to say that earnings will be a particular sum of money?
Very often in everyday speech future earnings are predicted to be a
given amount without any precise idea of the relationship of that
amount to the wide range of possible outcomes that the speaker
anticipates may occur.1' Modern financial theory measures the risk
in an opportunity to receive earnings by using the "expected value,"
or "mean earnings," of the opportunity. The expected value is a
weighted average of all the possible outcomes, the weight assigned
to each outcome being determined by the likelihood of its occurr-
ence. 2 For example, if there is a forty percent chance that earnings
would be $10,000, a thirty percent chance that earnings would be
$20,000, and a thirty percent chance that earnings would be $30,000,
the expected value of this earnings opportunity would be $19,000.13
The expected value, which gives due weight to each possible out-
come, can be thought of as the "average outcome," a measure of the
central tendency of earnings.
An earnings opportunity can be considered risky if there is a
significant probability of an outcome that differs dramatically from
the central tendency of earnings. A more precise notion of risk can
be obtained by again drawing upon modern financial theory to de-
fine risk as the "variance" of the possible outcomes in terms of the
expected value of these outcomes. Specifically, the variance of an
earnings opportunity can be computed by subtracting each possible
outcome from the expected value of the opportunity, squaring that
difference, and weighting each squared term by the probability of
the associated outcome. The weighted sum, called the variance, is
a measure of the tendency of the potential earnings to differ from
the expected value of the opportunity. 4 This measure very fre-
quently is used to define risk in financial analysis. 5 Its importance
11. See BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 55-56, who point out that the SEC report
in In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416 (1941), though estimating earnings at $130,000,
exhibits confusion as to whether that estimate represents a maximum, a minimum, or some
sort of average of the figures that earnings might have been expected to attain.
12. See, e.g., BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 55.
13. The expected value is equal to .40 x $10,000 + .30 x $20,000 + .30 x $30,000, or $4,000
+ $6,000 + $9,000, for a total of $19,000.
14. See, e.g., J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 24 (4th ed. 1977). The
variance of the earnings opportunity defined at note 13 supra and accompanying text may
be calculated as follows: .40 x (10,000 - 19,000)2 + .30 x (20,000 - 19,000)2 + .30 x (30,000 -
19,000)2, which equals 69,000,000.
15. A considerable body of financial analysis holds that the correct measure of risk for an
investment opportunity should not be the variance, but "beta," an index of the extent to
[Vol. 19:719
1978] UNCERTAINTY AND DAMAGES 723
in the analysis that follows does not lie in any advantage to be
gained from calculating it, but rather in the focus it provides for
intuitive notions of riskiness. 6 Judgments about the degree of risk
associated with an income opportunity can be made by asking "How
much might earnings be expected to fluctuate?" or "How likely is
it that earnings will be substantially lower than the mean?"'17 Both
the expected value, as a weighted average of possible outcomes, and
risk, as a measure of the likelihood of an outcome far from the
expected value, play a role in adjusting the value of an income
opportunity to account for uncertainty. Suppose that earnings are
very likely to be $20,000, but there is a twenty percent probability
that earnings will be only $10,000. The expected value of this oppor-
tunity is not $20,000; a deduction must be made for the twenty
which the riskiness of the opportunity cannot be avoided by diversification in the stock
market. See VAN HOaNE, supra note 14, at 59-65; J. LORm & M. HAMILTON, THE STocK MARKEr
204-27 (1973). Because "beta" for an opportunity is hard to assess intuitively, its usefulness
in damages cases seems limited.
16. See, e.g., Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 1975)
(significant fluctuations in plaintiff's sales from year to year are a factor suggesting that
plaintiff's profits were not reasonably certain); cf. notes 31-34 infra & accompanying text
(discussing judicial efforts to identify factors that make an opportunity risky).
17. Defining risk by a measure of the likelihood that the earnings actually realized will
differ from the mean might seem perverse, because occurences resulting in income greater
than the mean hardly are undesirable. One wishes to avoid only the possibility of unusually
low earnings. In response to this objection, models of risk analysis have been developed that
use the concept "semi-variance." In computing the semi-variance, a fixed reference point is
selected and, for each possible rtcome with lower earnings than the fixed reference point,
that difference is squared and then multiplied by the probability that the outcome will occur.
The reference point can be interpreted as a target figure such that earnings below the target
are regarded as undesirable. See H. MARKOWrrz, PoRTFoLio SLECTION 188-94 (Cowles Foun-
dation Monograph No. 14, 1959); Mao & Brewster, An E-ShModel of Capital Budgeting, in
PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 85 (J. Dickinson ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Capital Budgeting]. For
a generalization of this approach, see Fishburn, Mean-Risk Analysis with Risk Associated
with Below-Target Returns, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 116 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mean-Risk
Analysis]. The author of the seminal work on modern analysis of investment and securities
compared the semi-variance and the variance approaches to risk analysis and concluded that
measuring risk by the variance of the possible returns had a significant advantage in compu-
tational convenience. MARKOWrrz, supra, at 193-94. The significance of computational con-
venience has decreased with the development of computers. See Capital Budgeting, supra,
at 85; Mean-Risk'Analysis, supra, at 116. For expository purposes, however, the mean-
variance model probably retains an advantage. Moreover, the mean-variance model is the
basis for an extensive body of modern financial theory. See LORE & HAMILTON, supra note
15, at 171-97 passim; VAN HORNE, supra note 14, at 31. The variance approach and the semi-
variance approach lead to similar decisions, especially if the anticipated distribution of po-
tential earnings is roughly symmetrically distributed about the mean. See MARKowrrz, supra,
at 194.
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percent probability that earnings will be $10,000. The expected
value, thus, is $18,000. 8 In valuing the opportunity it seems reason-
able to use the expected value of the outcome rather than the most
likely outcome, that is, to make an allowance for the twenty percent
probability that earnings will be only $10,000 by making an appro-
priate deduction. Such a deduction, intended to give the plaintiff
an award based on the average earnings and giving appropriate
weight to all possibilities, will be called an "expected-value deduc-
tion" in this Article. As will be shown, when the courts speak of
adjusting an estimate of earnings for uncertainty they often have in
mind an expected-value deduction. Moreover, so appealing is the
idea of an expected-value deduction that courts sometimes make
the deduction without explicitly stating that they are doing so. In a
personal injury case in which earning capacity has been destroyed
completely, courts routinely use the working-life expectancy of the
injured party to estimate the value of lost earnings. Use of working-
life expectancy is intended to strike a balance between the possibil-
ity that earnings will last longer than that expectancy and the possi-
bility that earnings would have been received for a shorter period
of time. Working-life expectancy is an expected value, the expected
value of the working-life of the injured party.19
According to modern financial theory, however, the expected
value deduction is not a sufficient allowance for risk. Not only
should deductions be made so that the earnings estimate is an ap-
proximation of the expected value of the earnings, but further dis-
counting should reflect the extent to which the variance of the esti-
mated earnings demonstrates the undesirable riskiness of the oppor-
tunity. Such a further adjustment will be referred to as a "discount
for risk." An appropriate means to effect this latter adjustment,
corresponding to the adjustment that would occur in the market
price of a similar opportunity, is the use of a risk premium described
above, with the risk premium reflecting the variance associated with
the earnings estimate.
18. The expected value equals .80 x $20,000 + .20 x $10,000, which equals $16,000 + $2,000,
or $18,000.
19. A careful analysis of future earnings would have to account for the time pattern with
which earnings are to be received. In this instance a failure to work until the working-life
expectancy was reached would result in the loss of dollars, which, because they would be
received earlier, would be more valuable than the dollars which would be received by working
beyond the working-life expectancy.
[Vol. 19:719
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Discounting for Uncertainty in Damage Law
This Article proposes that courts deal with uncertainty in esti-
mating the value of a plaintiff's lost earnings" by reducing the
amount of damages that might otherwise be recovered by the plain-
tiff. This reduction should include both an expected-value deduc-
tion, so that the earnings estimate represents an average of all possi-
ble outcomes, and a discount for risk. Typically, when a plaintiffs
lost earnings must be estimated for a number of years into the
future, discounting for risk can be accomplished by adding a risk
premium to the riskless discount rate, which simply measures the
extent to which a present certain dollar is more valuable than a
future certain dollar.2'
An example of the range of possibilities commonly associated
with an opportunity to receive earnings occurred in Furrer v. Inter-
national Health Assurance Co.22 Plaintiff had a contract to operate
a sales agency for defendant, an insurance company, which defen-
dant breached. One of plaintiff's experts provided three different
projections of the present value of his expected future profits, each
discounted at 4.5 percent: $474,000, $573,000, and $669,000. The
trial court's adoption of the lowest projection was affirmed on ap-
peal. A better approach, however, would have been to choose the
median projection but to add to the discount rate of 4.5 percent an
appropriate risk premium to take account of the fact that the profit
20. In this Article the defendant's liability is assumed. Thus, the possibility of adjusting
the damages awarded to allow for the certainty of the proof of liability is not discussed. For
discussions of the issues presented by the uncertainty of liability, see L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE
AND THE PROVABLE 74-81 (1977); A Symposium on Philosophy from Law: Compromise and
Decision Making in the Resolution of Controversies, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 731 (1964). Also
outside the scope of this Article is the possibility that the degree of the defendant's moral
fault in the form of willful or reckless conduct may affect the willingness of a court to find
that damages have been established with sufficient certainty or that compensatory damages
are not excessive. See Bauer, The Degree of Moral Guilt as Affecting Defendant's Liability,
81 U. PA. L. REv. 586 (1933); Bauer, The Degree of Defendant's Fault as Affecting the
Administration of the Law of Excessive Compensatory Damages, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 583 (1934)
[hereinafter cited as Excessive Compensatory Damages].
21. Uncertainty is an independent reason for discounting, applicable even if the plaintiff
would have received the lost income inimediately. In principle, earnings that would have been
received before the trial also should be discounted for risk. Cf. Martin Motor Sales v. Saab-
Scania of America, Inc., [1978-1] Trade Cas. 61,907 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (adjusting figures for
1973 and subsequent years in a 1978 decision). Sometimes there will be less uncertainty about
what would have happened in years before trial than about what will happen in the future,
in which case the appropriate discount will not be large.
22. 256 Or. 429, -, 474 P.2d 759, 766-67 (1970).
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of the sales agency might have been closer to the lower projection.
This yields a measure of damages which approximates the price that
the sales agency could have commanded if the contract right had
been sold on the market. Use of the low projection unduly empha-
sizes the worst possible outcome. The approach adopted in Furrer
also would lead to an award of zero damages if high profits were very
likely but there was a modest possibility of no profits at all.
23
Adjusting the amount of damages awarded for a lost opportunity
to receive income results in a measure of damages that corresponds
to the market value of the opportunity.24 This approach has the
additional virtue of avoiding the two unsatisfactory and inaccurate
methods of handling uncertainty customarily used by American
courts. The first alternative, to make an award based on lost earn-
ings only if these can be proven with sufficient certainty, is unsatis-
factory because uncertain opportunities do have a value, often a
substantial value.2 5 The other alternative is to award damages but
to ignore the uncertainty as to the amount of lost earnings in valuing
the loss. This alternative generally overcompensates the plaintiff.26
23. The court's approach in Furrer is endorsed in an excellent student work. Comment,
Remedies - Lost Profits as Contract Damages for Unestablished Business: The New Busi-
ness Rule Becomes Outdated, 56 N. C. L. REv. 693, 732-33 & n.238 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as New Business Rule].
24. Dobbs observes that the courts' reluctance to award damages for lost profits may stem
from a traditional preoccupation with the protection of capital rather than income. D. DOBBS,
Rmmms 143-48, 154 (1973).,
Modern financial thought, however, emphasizes cash flows; it views the value of a capital
asset as dependent on the probable pattern and the riskiness of the income generated by the
asset. See, e.g., VAN HORNE, supra note 14, at 76-81. The argument of this Article is essentially
that the law of damages should make use of simple financial techniques to estimate the
capital value of an income opportunity. If sensibly applied, these techniques will yield an-
swers approximating the values that the income opportunity would command on a market.
They should go a long way toward resolving the difficulties described by an English judge,
discussing damages in a personal injury case: "No true value can be reached, for there is
nothing to establish it, as in the case of the value of goods, of the cost of production or a price
reached by the process of supply and demand and the haggling of the market." For a discus-
sion of the application of these techniques in personal injury cases, see notes 35-56 infra &
accompanying text.
25. This alternative, which tends to result in undercompensation of the plaintiff, fre-
quently is adopted in contract cases because of the "certainty rule." The certainty rule
requires that proof of lost profits satisfy a standard, phrased in terms of "reasonable cer-
tainty," which is higher than the usual preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in civil liti-
gation. See notes 58-71 infra & accompanying text.
26. Discounting for uncertainty may be expected to increase the amount of the plaintiff's
award when a defendant proves that opportunities were available for the plaintiff to mitigate
damages but those opportunities were uncertain. For an example, see note 57 infra.
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Confronted by these two extremes, courts have developed formu-
las to justify choosing the less unsatisfactory one .2 Although in
some circumstances these formulas permit a court considerable lati-
tude in selecting which of the two extremes it will adopt, the choice
between all or nothing ends up being made in a way that is only
imperfectly controlled by principle and precedent. Application of
both an expected-value deduction and a discount for risk would
facilitate a simpler and more consistent law of damages.
In rejecting a defendant's argument that no damages should be
awarded because the plaintiff's receipt of future income was uncer-
tain, courts often invoke the maxim that a wrongdoer cannot com-
plain about uncertainty resulting from his wrongful act.2 Reasoning
that any risk thereby created should be placed entirely on the defen-
dant, courts have felt compelled to adopt the opposite extreme of
awarding the plaintiff the entire amount claimed, thereby ignoring
the possibly substantial uncertainty attending the ultimate receipt
of this income. These courts have failed to consider that the actual
value of an uncertain earnings opportunity is neither zero nor the
highest potential amount; rather, the correct amount could be de-
termined only by adjusting the more optimistic amount to reflect
the degree of risk to which the amount is subject. Before the defen-
dant's wrongful act, however, the plaintiff bore the riskiness of his
earnings, a risk not created by the defendant. Although the defen-
dant's act made it necessary to value the plaintiff's potential earn-
ings judicially, this does not seem sufficient reason to place the
plaintiff in a better position than he occupied before the act by
27. Competing formulas are available to a court weighing the adequacy of plaintiff's proof
of damages:
While it is true that the Court may make a just and reasonable estimate of the
damage based upon inferential as well as direct proof because the wrongdoer
should bear the risk of any uncertainty in computing damages which his wrong
has created, nevertheless, damages cannot be based on speculation and guess
work even though the defendant by his own wrong has precluded a more precise
determination.
Key West Hand Print Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 605, 614 (S.D. Fla. 1966),
aff'd, 381 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1967). The competing formulas are reminiscent of Karl Llewel-
lyn's demonstration that statutory construction in judicial opinions frequently proceeds at
the level of "thrust and counter-thrust" between maxims that would support opposing con-
clusions on similar facts. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960). For a
list of formulas used to award damages even though the proof is uncertain, see C. McCoRMICK,
LAW OF DAMAGES 101-04 (1935).
28. See MCCORMICK, supra note 27, at 102-03.
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making the defendant a virtual insurer of the plaintiff's future in-
come.
29
Courts already have some experience in making judgments as to
the amount of risk attending an earnings opportunity.30 The cer-
tainty rule requires a determination that receipt of the earnings was
sufficiently certain to permit their recovery. In making this determi-
nation, courts too often exclude certain types of earnings opportuni-
ties or enterprises as too uncertain for valuation and fail to look
beyond these characterizations to the merits of the individual case
and the degree of risk actually involved.
For example, the profits in certain types of business such as thea-
trical and advertising ventures have been considered inherently too
speculative to permit recovery of any damages .3 Advertising and
theatrical ventures may involve a high degree of risk, such that the
prospective returns should be heavily discounted, but the opportun-
ities to engage in those industries cannot be said to be worthless.
29. When the risk has been imposed on the plaintiff by the defendant, the awards should
be increased by a sum equal to the premium that persons on the market would pay to avoid
such a risk. For example, consider an award for future recurring medical expenses, which is
often made in personal injury cases. Compensation is being made for an anticipated loss of
future dollars, a loss imposed on the plaintiff by the defendant's wrongful act. Since this loss
will not be experienced all at once, it is appropriate to discount it to take account of the fact
that compensation is being paid in present dollars, which are more valuable than future
dollars. An adjustment for uncertainty also should be made. Here, however, fair compensa-
tion seems to call for an addition to the award, rather than a reduction, because the amount
of medical expenses later incurred might exceed those which are projected. The uncertainty
as to the amount of future medical expenses has been imposed on the plaintiff by the defen-
dant's wrongdoing. By contrast, the uncertainty in a plaintiff's original income opportunity
was inherent in that opportunity and reduced its value. The defendant has placed the plain-
tiff in a position where his opportunity has to be valued, but that fact is usually ignored in
assessing damages on the basis of market value. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 144-45. Dobbs
points out an interesting exception. In Juncker v. T.L. James & Co., 148 So. 2d 795 (La. App.
1962), the defendant, a good-faith trespasser, took dirt from plaintiff's land and sold it for 15
cents profit per yard. The court awarded 15 cents per yard plus an additional five cents per
yard for plaintiff's unwillingness to sell.
The problems created by the uncertainty in forecasting the cost of long-term institutional
care were discussed in Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
aff'd sub. nom. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972), in which the court recognized
that the income generated by a lump-sum award sometimes exceeds the actual future outlays
and sometimes is less than these outlays.
30. In practice, an expert testifying on the value of lost profits should be asked his opinion
as to an appropriate discount rate based on the discount rates applied to comparable oppor-
tunities.
31. See cases cited in MCCORMICK, supra note 27, at 112-13 & n.53; Comment, Lost Profits
as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 1014
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Lost Profits].
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Many investors are willing to pay for those opportunities. Nor are
all ventures in those industries alike; some may be less risky than
others. This may account for the courts' failure to apply rigorously
a rule against recovery of profits in high-risk industries.31
Courts also have asserted that the profits from a new business are
too speculative to permit their recovery.3 Here again, the profits of
some new businesses may be very uncertain; this would require a
substantial discounting of those profits but not a ruling which says,
in effect, that the potential profits are worthless. 34
DISCOUNTING TO Avom OVERPAYMENT IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES
Damages for lost future earnings frequently are the largest compo-
nent of a plaintiffs award in personal injury cases.15 Economic testi-
32. See cases cited in MCCORMICK, supra note 27, at 112-13 n.53; Lost Profits, supra note
31, at 1014 n.128.
33. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 154-55; Lost Profits, supra note 31, at 1014; New Business
Rule, supra note 23, passim.
The new business rule in contract cases is analogous to the rule in Delaware corporations
cases against projecting future earnings of a corporation instead of simply relying on the past
earnings of the corporation. See Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213
A.2d 203 (1965). One Delaware court has recognized that the rule does not make sense if
blindly followed because other factors in the record may indicate that unadjusted past earn-
ings would be a poor basis for projecting future earnings. David J. Green & Co. v. Dunhill
Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968). The prospective earnings of a corporation may also
be considered in Delaware when assigning a price-earnings ratio to capitalize past earnings.
See David J. Green & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 34-35 (Del. Ch. 1971).
34. For a discussion of methods of estimating the lost profits of a new business, see New
Business Rule, supra note 23, at 712-21.
35. See Present Value of Lost Wages, supra note 6, at 424. Recent economic analysis
suggests that considering only lost earnings would be incomplete from a deterrent point of
view and, for a living victim, from a compensatory point of view. For example, an individual
might pay more than the expected value of his earnings in order to avoid premature death.
See Conley, The Value of Human Life in the Demand for Safety, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 45 (1976).
The cost of personal injury might be measured, for example, by the number of years of life
'lost in terms of the quality of those years with regard to such characteristics as strength and
vigor. See Zeckhauser & Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 5
(1976) (suggesting measurement of damage to individuals in terms of "quality-adjusted life
years"). See generally M. JONES-LEE, THE VALUE OF LIFE (1976); Acton, Measuring the Mone-
tary Value of Lifesaving Programs, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 46 (1976). The deterrent purpose
of tort law would be served best by a measure of damages that reflects the value society places
on the loss of a life. No damage award is given in American wrongful death cases, however,
for the reduction in the decedent's length of life; nor are courts generally permitted to make
an award for the reduction of a surviving victim's life expectancy. In the United Kingdom
an award is made, but conventionally it is of a modest amount. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at
549. In fact, defendants can sometimes obtain a reduction in the amount to be awarded for
future medical care on the ground that the victim's life expectancy has been lowered, thereby
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mony plays a major role in personal injury litigation," and the use
of economic analysis in these cases has been discussed extensively
by economists and by lawyers expert in economics."7 Consequently,
courts have taken an increasingly sophisticated approach to the
computation of lost earnings .
Generally, courts and commentators have ignored the fact that
the injured person's income prospects were risky and have failed to
consider the use of a discount rate containing a risk premium."
Although most courts require that prospective tort damages be re-
duced to their present worth,4" their sole concern is with the time
value of money. The general rule is that in ascertaining the discount
rate, "[tihe jury should determine from the evidence what interest
decreasing the period for which that medical care is needed.
36. An example of proposed testimony appears in 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 701-24.
37. See, e.g., R. POSNER, EcONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 144-49 (2d ed. 1977); Henderson, The
Comsideration of Increased Productivity and the Discounting of Future Earnings to Present
Value, 20 S. D. L. REv. 307 (1975).
38. For an example of careful analysis, see Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F.
Supp. 1271 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.
1975).
39. An exception is Peck & Hopkins, Economics and Impaired Earning Capacity in Per-
sonal Injury Cases, 44 WASH. L. REv. 351, 374 (1969):
[Tihe usual instruction directs a jury to determine the present value of lost or
impaired earning capacity . . . .[T]he statement that the jury should deter-
mine the present value of the future earnings of the victim is not entirely accur-
ate, in the sense that the object is not to determine what price might have been
received by sale or assignment of that earning capacity in a hypothetical earn-
ings market. There is no such market, and in that sense no present value of
future earnings. Indeed, considering the risks that confront wage earners, such
a hypothetical market would undoubtedly impose a high discount and thus
establish a very low sales price for earning capacities.
Peck and Hopkins argue, however, that the lump sum awarded should be that amount
which, when invested at a rate of interest attainable by inexperienced investors, will permit
periodic payments of principal and interest equivalent to the lost potential earnings. Id. at
374-75. The authors, however, do not discuss the conflict between this standard and that
stated in the first sentence of their article: "The major objective of American tort law is to
compensate a wrongfully injured person and thereby place him in the position in which he
would have been but for the wrong." Id. at 351.
Another commentator points out that the terms on which millions of people in the United
Kingdom acquire goods on the installment plan often involve an effective rate of interest of
20 percent or more. P. ATIYAH, ACcIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 198-99 (1970). Atiyah,
however, does not draw from this the inference that the high rates charged on personal loans
might be appropriate for discounting future personal earnings. Instead, he regards what he
terms "the value of capital sum over the income which it replaces" as compensating, at least
in part, for factors, such as disregard of inflation, which may work toward undercompensation
of a plaintiff in a personal injury case. Id. at 194-99.
40. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 570-75.
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could be fairly expected from safe investments which a person of
ordinary prudence, but without particular financial experience or
skill, could make in that locality."'"
Using the interest rate obtainable on safe investments42 results in
a relatively low discount rate. In effect, courts treat the jury's esti-
mation of the plaintiff's or decedent's future earnings as if it were
an absolute certainty. The risk that the victim's earnings might
have been less is placed entirely on the defendant. That risk is in
many cases significant. Anticipated promotions might not have
been realized. A depression in the nation or the industry might have
reduced income or caused unemployment. Even in the absence of
the injuries caused by defendant, sickness, injury, or early death
might still have occured through the fault of no one.
If compensation is the objective, then the damages awarded to a
plaintiff should equal the value of what he lost.43 The question is
41. Southern Pac. Co. v. Klinge, 65 F.2d 85, 87 (10th Cir. 1933) (citing Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. v. Kelley, 241 U.S. 485 (1916)) (emphasis supplied). Kelley was the first case to require
that prospective tort damages be discounted. The Supreme Court stated:
So far as a verdict is based upon the deprivation of future benefits, it will afford
more than compensation if it be made up by aggregating the benefits without
taking account of the earning power of the money that is presently to be
awarded. It is self-evident that a given sum of money in hand is worth more than
the like sum of money payable in the future . . . [aInd the putting out of
money at interest is at this day so common a matter that ordinarily it can not
be excluded from consideration in determining the present equivalent of future
payments, since a reasonable man, even from selfish motives, would probably
gain some money by way of interest upon the money recovered.
241 U.S. at 489-90. Clearly, the Court contemplated only that the time value of money be
considered in reducing estimates of future earnings to their present value.
42. As of 1969, an interest rate of 4% frequently was used in federal courts, a rate which
Dobbs characterizes as "relatively high" for this purpose. DOBBS, supra note 24, at 571. Some
insight into the effect of adding a risk premium can be gained by considering the "prime
rate," the lowest rate typically charged on business loans to large, well-established, and
financially sound companies. VAN HORNE, supra note 14, at 450. In 1969, the prime rate
reached 8 1/2%; in parts of the 1970's, it has gone above 11%. Id. at 451. The risk premium on
an individual's income should be even higher. In 1957, when the prime rate was approxi-
mately 4%, the interest rates charged on personal loans ranged from 12% to 28%. Compare
id. at 451 with Wilkinson, Present Values of Lifetime Earnings for Different Occupations, 74
J. POL. ECON. 556, 561 n.9 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Present Values of Lifetime Earningsl.
43. The major objective of American tort law is usually said to be compensation of the
injured party to restore him to the position that he occupied before the injury. See 1 F. HARPER
& F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS 1300-01 (1956). See also DOBBS, supra note 24, at 540. From
this point of view, the failure to take account of the riskiness of the lost potential earnings
results in overpayment; the plaintiff is paid as though the earnings were certain even though
their riskiness made them less valuable. Recent writers on torts have emphasized that tort
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what the earnings he might have made in the future would be worth
today. Determining that figure would be easy if there were a market
in which the rights to an individual's lifetime earnings could be
purchased and sold.4 A victim's loss would be evidenced by the
selling price of his earnings before his injury or by comparison with
the market value of the earnings of individuals similarly situated.
Buyers in a hypothetical earnings market would consider both the
expected value of those earnings and their riskiness. 5 Valuation of
damages deter conduct that brings about more harm than good. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE
COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); POSNER, supra note 37, at 143. From this point of view also, the
failure to take account of the riskiness of the lost earnings opportunity still results in overpay-
ment. Because the amount of harm is overstated, too heavy a penalty will be imposed on an
activity which may have benefits as well as costs. See POSNER, supra note 37, at 166; cf.
Valavanis, Traffic Safety from an Economist's Point of View, 72 Q.J. ECON. 477 (1958) (traffic
accidents might be reduced toward zero by expensive roadways and low speed limits, but the
gain in safety would not be worth the loss from expense and inconvenience).
44. As to the usefulness of a market in valuing lost earnings, see note 24 supra.
45. The economics of human capital analyzes the value of the future earnings of an individ-
ual in terms of how the earnings would be valued on a market. Two seminal works are T.
ScHuLTz, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF EDUCATION (1963) and G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1964).
The effect of uncertainty on the present value of individual earnings has been the subject
of some discussion in the economics literature. Milton Friedman has pointed out that high
earnings in an occupation like movie acting are analogous to the high return for a lottery
winner; someone entering the movie-acting business, like someone buying a lottery ticket, has
at that moment expected earnings which are far less in amount than the prize a winner would
receive. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 162-63 (1962). Friedman implied, but did not
elaborate upon, a possible consequence: riskiness of earnings would tend to cause risk-
avoiders not to enter the occupation unless payments to those who were successful rose to a
higher than normal level.
The need for high interest rates in discounting the potential earnings of an individual is
stressed by Thurow, who points to the high variance of earnings in some occupations, the lack
of knowledge as to how productive any individual will be, and the lack of "collateral value,"
in the sense that an individual who is disabled from using a skill effectively cannot sell the
skill to someone who wants it. L. THUROW, INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL 22-24, 70-74, 77-78
(1970). The importance of risk was also acknowledged in a study that attempted to measure
the present values of the lifetime earnings for different occupations, using discount rates of
5%, 8%, and 10% to reflect alternative investment opportunites such as government bonds
and investment in manufacturing enterprises. The author, however, observed that if the
interest rates charged on personal loans were used, a much higher discount rate would become
pertinent. He cited studies made by the United States Federal Reserve System in 1957
showing that at that time the charges on personal loans ranged from 12% to 28%. Present
Value of Lifetime Earnings, supra note 42, at 561 n.9. The interest rate charged on personal
loans, of course, reflects the weight assigned by the lender to the risk that the buyer will not
be able to repay the loan for reasons such as instability of income. For longer term loans
higher interest rates would be anticipated to reflect increasing risk. Similarly, in personal
injury cases it is frequently necessary to give awards for a loss of income over a considerable
period of time, with corresponding riskiness.
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lost earnings for purposes of damage law should be based on the
same factors that these hypothetical buyers and sellers would con-
sider.
By using the interest rate on safe investments as the discount
rate, courts currently are omitting from the calculation the signifi-
cant factor of risk. That omission not only leads to overcompensa-
tion but makes more awkward courts' consideration of evidence
concerning such contingencies as inflation,48 promotions, and wage
increases. Allowing testimony about these contingencies without
allowing for risk tends further to overcompensate the plaintiff. Ig-
noring these considerations as well as the risk only serves to omit
relevant factors from the computation. The solution lies in admit-
ting evidence of reasonable contingencies together with expert testi-
mony as to an appropriate discount rate, with due regard for risk.47
Weiss has pointed out that scientists working for private companies receive higher average
salaries than scientists working for public enterprises and that this corresponds to a greater
variance of salaries in private industry than in public service. He argues that risk aversion
among scientists may call for higher salaries in private industry to make up for the greater
riskiness of employment in private industry. Weiss, The Risk Element in Educational and
Occupational Specialization, 80 J. POL. ECON. 1203 (1972). For a theoretical discussion of the
relationship between the level of salary and the riskiness of salaries, see Levhari & Weiss,
The Effect of Risk on the Investment in Human Capital, 64 AM. ECON. Rav. 950 (1974).
46. Expectations about inflation create complexities that are outside the scope of this
Article. It is assumed that inflation will be treated consistently in projecting the lost earnings
and in choosing the discount rate. See POSNER, supra note 37, at 81-82. For a discussion of
the legal controversy over treatment of inflation, see Note, Torts-Damages-Adjusting Fu-
ture Earnings for Inflation, 37 OHIo ST. L.J. 138 (1976).
47. It has been suggested that much uncertainty in personal injury cases as to what loss
has been caused by the defendant's wrongful act could be removed if periodic payments,
rather than a lump sum payment, were permitted. See ATIYAH, supra note 39, at 175-85; S.
SCHREIBER, DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH CASES 21-22 (1965). Periodic
payments, if permitted, would resolve uncertainty as to such questions as what the future
expenses of medical care will be and what the plaintiff in his injured condition will be able
to earn in the future. Cf. Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
aff'd sub. nom. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226, 1228-29 (3d Cir. 1972) (periodic payments
under a trust fund arrangement would be a desirable way of resolving uncertainty as to the
expenses of future medical care for the injured plaintiff, but the court did not have the power
to adopt such a remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act). Any such periodic system has
the potential defect of "moral hazard" because a plaintiff whose expenses are paid as long as
he incurs them or whose earnings are deducted from a periodic award in place of lost future
earnings will have an incentive not to minimize medical expenses or not to maximize his
earnings. See, e.g., Marshall, Moral Hazard, 66 AM. ECON. Rav. 880 (1976). Periodic pay-
ments, however, would not help to resolve uncertainty as to hypothetical questions such as
what the plaintiff would have been able to earn if the defendant's wrongful act had not
occurred. Because the uncertainty with regard to those questions would remain, discounting
for uncertainty would be appropriate even if periodic payments were possible.
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Because damage awards in personal injury cases sometimes in-
volve estimation of earnings far into the future under conditions of
great uncertainty, the failure to discount for uncertainty can result
in awarding the plaintiff considerably more money than his earnings
opportunity would have been worth on a hypothetical market. For
example, in Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corporation,4" the plaintiff,
eight years old at the time of the trial, had been permanently and
grievously disfigured when drain cleaner spilled on her face at the
age of one year. The defendant was liable for this disfigurement and
any economic losses caused by it. The trial court accepted the testi-
mony of the plaintiff's expert witness, an economist, that the pres-
ent value of the sum of money which the plaintiff would have earned
during her lifetime, had she not been injured, was $878,951. This
calculation was premised on the assumptions that the plaintiff
would have graduated from college, would have entered the work
force in 1989, and would have worked until 2026. The plaintiffs
lifetime earnings were assumed to increase at a rate of twelve per-
cent per year early in her life and by a decreasing rate thereafter
until late in her life, at which point they were assumed to increase
at an annual rate of 4.03 percent. Plaintiff's starting salary in 1989
as a college graduate was estimated to be $19,487.04. Using the
statistical history of a college graduate's income, the plaintiffs ex-
pert projected a salary of $267,000 for the year 2026 with an addi-
tional $37,000 in fringe benefits, characterizing these earnings as
"highly probable."49
The discount rate chosen for these projected earnings was a typi-
cal rate of return for a liquid, long-term, very safe investment such
as long-term government bonds. The discounting procedure was
sufficiently complicated to use a sliding scale initially at six percent
and decreasing gradually over time to five percent. From the sum
of $878,951 thus calculated, the plaintiffs expert subtracted the
present value of the earnings the plaintiff might be expected to
make in her disfigured condition, based on the assumption that she
would be able to earn the projected minimum wage. The expert's
resulting estimate of lost wages was $608,215, which was close to the
48. 413 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Ohio 1976). The opinion of the court on liability, before the
court ordered a further hearing at which additional expert economic testimony on damages
was taken, is reported at 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
49. 413 F. Supp. at 837.
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amount originally awarded by the court.'
Some of the court's language in Drayton indicated a recognition
of the great uncertainty involved in projecting both the future in-
come of the plaintiff had she remained healthy and the alternative
income of the plaintiff in her disfigured condition. 5 It referred to the
plaintiff's expert's estimate as based on "assumption," and ob-
served that "no one, at this time, can accurately predict what resi-
dual earning capacity [plaintiff] has . . .,,5 Finally, in regard to
the computations of plaintiffs expert, the court stated that his
projection of plaintiff's earnings absent the disfigurement "might be
somewhat optimistic in theory" and that the projection of her actual
earnings in her disfigured state "might be somewhat optimistic in
fact."',3
That the opportunity lost by plaintiff in Drayton was far from
riskless is demonstrated by the number and the uncertainty of the
assumptions underlying the plaintiff's expert's computations. The
expert's projection was based on the assumption that the plaintiff
would attend college, despite his acknowledgment that at that time
only seven to eight percent of the black female population gradu-
ated from college.54 To carry out his computations, the plaintiffs
expert had to adjust the statistical tables for the worklife expect-
ancy of men because the tables for women were incomplete. He also
assumed that males and females would earn the same rates of pay
by 1989. His estimate of nonpecuniary fringe benefits was based on
the current statewide average for Ohio, although the plaintiff ob-
viously might not live in Ohio during the years 1989 to 2026.
The uncertainty of the plaintiff's future earnings, beginning some
nine to thirteen years from the date of the testimony and ending
some fifty or so years later, is well illustrated by the three alterna-
tive estimates of her earnings, based upon varying sets of circum-
50. The court stated that the plaintiff's expert's estimate of $608,215 "represents only a
1.3% upward variance from the court's original award of lost wages." Id. at 838.
51. Id. at 836.
52. Id. at 837-38.
53: Id. at 838.
54. The expert's projection of the plaintiff's earnings in her disfigured state was based on
the assumption that she would not attend college. In his original opinion the trial judge stated
that the assumption that plaintiff's future income absent the disfigurement would have
paralleled that of an average college graduate was "a source of some difficulty." He suggested
at that time that this assumption might cause the prognostication of the plaintiff's future
earnings, absent disfigurement, to fall afoul of the rule that the prediction "must be based
on 'reasonable certainty' and not mere possibilities." 395 F. Supp. at 1096.
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stances, offered by the defendant's expert. The figures offered in-
volved different assumptions as to the growth of productivity and
the rapidity with which discriminaton against blacks would be elim-
inated. Despite this indication of uncertainty, the defendant's own
expert followed the usual assumptions and used a discount rate with
no risk premium.5
Ironically, one of the reasons given by the trial judge for accepting
almost completely the testimony of plaintiff's expert, as opposed to
that of defendant's expert, was that:
The figures ultimately arrived at [by the plaintiff's expert]
were precise and at no time did [he] waver from his position.
[The defendant's expert], on the other hand, could offer only
alternative figures, based upon varying sets of circumstances,
and, in at least one instance, stated that the answer to the court's
question lie [sic] only somewhere within that range of figures.2
Thus, the fact that the testimony of the defendant's expert reflected
the uncertainty surrounding a projection extending so many years
into the future, on the basis of very little specific information, was
regarded as a weakness. That uncertainty, however, was an inherent
part of the opportunity impaired by the defendant's wrong and
diminished the value of that opportunity. Failure to recognize this
resulted in overcompensation of the plaintiff.57
55. Lord Denning recognized the great uncertainty of predicting the future earnings of a
very young child in Taylor v. Bristol Omnibus Co., [19751 2 All E.R. 1107, 1113:
At [plaintiff's] very young age [future earnings] are speculative in the ex-
treme. Who can say what a baby boy will do with his life: He may be in charge
of a business and make much money. He may get into a mediocre groove and
just pay his way. Or he may be another failure. It is even more speculative with
a baby girl. She may marry and bring up a large family, but earn nothing
herself. Or, she may be a career woman earning wages.
Lord Denning, however, concluded that the current practice of English courts was to attempt
to estimate a child's lost earnings. The trial judge had used plaintiff's father's income of
£2000 per year as the measure of the child's prospective earnings from age 19 to age 66. His
use of a rather conventional multiplier of 16 in this circumstance was approved on appeal.
There was no discussion of the possibility of decreasing the multiplier to reflect the high
degree of uncertainty attending the prediction of the young plaintiff's future earnings. A
multiplier of 16 for a perpetual income stream would correspond to a discount rate of a little
more than 6%, a rate with very little risk premium. See note 145 infra. For a discussion of
the efforts of English courts to account for risk through appropriate selection of a multiplier
for predicted earnings, see notes 142-60 infra & accompanying text.
56. 413 F. Supp. at 840.
57. The projection of the plaintiff's earnings in her disfigured condition, at minimum wage,
may have represented only the minimum amount that she could be expected to earn. Her
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THE CERTAINTY RULE: UNDERCOMPENSATION OR OYERCOMPENSATION
If the plaintiffs proof leaves too much uncertainty as to his earn-
ings absent the defendant's wrongul act, his recovery is denied. The
usual standard of proof requires the plaintiff to establish the
amount of damages "with reasonable certainty." 8 The effect of the
rule is "to increase the injured party's burden of persuasion well
beyond the usual one of making out his case by the 'preponderance
or greater weight of the evidence.' ",1 "Reasonable certainty," how-
ever, may vary from one category of litigation to another. In per-
sonal injury cases, lost earnings are routinely awarded, despite great
uncertainty as to their amount. 0 Similarly, in antitrust cases, appli-
cation of the certainty requirement has been eased considerably, in
part by the doctrine that once a plaintiff has established the fact of
his injury, a reasonable approximation of the amount of injury is
sufficient."' In contrast, the certainty rule retains considerable im-
physical and intellectual abilities apparently were not diminshed by her disfigurement, al-
though psychological handicaps might have limited her educational and working ability. If,
however, the plaintiff's earnings might be expected to fall below the level of her estimated
earnings in her disfigured condition, as would be true if an expected value type of estimate
were used, then a discount for uncertainty would be appropriate. Discounting the estimated
sum that the plaintiff can be expected to earn despite the injury has the effect of increasing
the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff. Similarly, discounting the plaintiff's earn-
ings in his injured state to reflect uncertainty as to their amount would have been appropriate
in Rowden v. Clarke Chapman & Co., [19671 3 All E.R. 608, in which the plaintiff, unable
to follow his normal employment, was retraining as a welder. One-fifth of those who took the
training course in which the plaintiff was enrolled failed to complete it. Moreover, the average
earnings of a welder at different localities varied widely and were affected by the types of
welding jobs available.
58. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 24, at 149-50, 798-99.
59. Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1210-11
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Breach of Contract Remedies].
60. See notes 39-57 supra & accompanying text. There is a contrast in treatment between
lost profit and lost income from wages and salaries, as illustrated by Smith v. Corsat, 260
N.C. 92, 131 S.E.2d 894 (1963), in which evidence as to lost profits in a personal injury case
was held to be too speculative to support an award for lost profit yet admissible as evidence
of the amount of earnings for personal services that the claimant could have been expected
to receive.
Presumably, a policy of compensating tort victims for losses or of deterring torts would be
fostered as much by allowing the recovery of lost commercial profits on the basis of
"speculative" evidence as by allowing the recovery of lost wages and salaries based on similar
evidence. One may question the wisdom of a rule that imposes higher standards of proof in
contracts cases than in personal injury cases. Cf. Excessive Compensatory Damages, supra
note 20.
61. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Story Parchment Co.
v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
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portance in contract cases.
The certainty rule's higher standard of proof increases the likeli-
hood of undercompensation. Such undercompensation occurred in
Eastern Federal Corp. v. Avco-Embassy Pictures, Inc.12 The defen-
dant entered into a contract with the plaintiff, a theater operator,
granting the plaintiff the exclusive right to show the motion picture
"The Graduate" in its Atlanta-area theaters. Following a dispute
about playing dates for the film, the defendant awarded the exclu-
sive first-run rights for the picture to one of the plaintiff's competi-
tors.
The court found that the plaintiff had a valid contract with the
defendant, which the defendant had breached. On the question of
damages, however, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not
recover the anticipated profits from one of its three theaters, the
Coronet, which was still under construction at the time of the
breach. The Coronet opened one week later and could have shown
the film, but the court held that "the anticipated profits of the
Coronet Theater are necessarily speculative and uncertain, whereas
those of the other two theaters are predictable .... ,,13 The Coronet
incurred losses subsequent to its opening, and the court conceded
that "the popularity of the moving picture 'The Graduate' was such
as to attract substantial patronage and thereby produce some profit
at any suitable theatre . . ... " Yet the testimony of plaintiff's
expert was dismissed as guesswork.
The court's finding of an added element of risk involved in realiz-
ing profits from a new theater as opposed to an established one was
correct. Other things being equal, opening a new business is riskier
than operating an already profitable one, although the presence of
other factors may make a new business a relatively safe venture."
But the court's method of dealing with the added uncertainty in
Eastern Federal by disallowing any recovery, even though some
profit concededly would have been earned, was unfair to the plain-
tiff. The uncertainty diminished the value of plaintiff's opportunity
but did not make the opportunity worthless. The court could have
62. 326 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified, 331 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Ga. 1971). The
case is discussed in DOBBS, supra note 24, at 152-53.
63. 326 F. Supp. at 1285.
64. Id. at 1284.
65. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 154-55; cf. notes 33-34 supra & accompanying text for a
discussion of the new business rule.
[Vol. 19:719
UNCERTAINTY AND DAMAGES
accomplished a more just result by attempting to mieasure the value
of plaintiff's risky opportunity.
The certainty rule does not prevent overcompensation; no allow-
ance for risk is made once the plaintiff proves damages with
"reasonable certainty." Perma Research & Development Co. v.
Singer Co." is a good example of such overcompensation. Plaintiff
had entered into a contract granting Singer the rights to the plain-
tiff's patented anti-skid device for automobiles. The contract was
not merely an assignment of a patent, but also implied an obligation
on the part of Singer to use its best efforts and purported engineer-
ing expertise to perfect and market the device. Because Singer had
not used its best efforts for a reasonable time to perfect the appara-
tus, it breached the contract.
Singer claimed that the device could not be perfected and could
not in any event have been successfully sold either as original equip-
ment on automobiles or as an accessory. Evidence showed that the
major automobile manufacturers had had little success in market-
ing anti-skid devices on their 1969-1974 models and that compara-
ble devices available for five years preceding the trial had not sold
well as accessories. Moreover, the anti-skid device which Ford had
attempted to market was superior to the plaintiffs device. Despite
uncertainty whether the device could have been successfully mar-
keted even if perfected, the trial judge awarded damages based on
sales projections made by Singer ten years earlier, before it signed
the contract.17 He further adjusted the annual sales estimates up-
ward to reflect expansion of the automobile market during the years
during which the contract was to have been effective. The number
of units estimated to have been sold each year was then multiplied
by the royalty specified in the contract. The result was five million
dollars, exclusive of interest and costs amounting to more than one
and one-half million dollars. A more satisfactory result would have
been reached if the judge had discounted his ultimate estimate of
lost royalties to reflect the considerable uncertainty inherent in the
original sales forecast.
Generally, commentators have suggested that the policy behind
the certainty rule is to limit the possibility of excessive recovery by
66. 402 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affl'd, 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
987 (1976).
67. The contract in dispute vas entered into in December, 1964; the case was decided in
April, 1975.
19781
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:719
the plaintiff." The rule, however, operates as only a crude limit on
large recoveries. If the plaintiff's damages are uncertain, the dam-
ages are not merely limited but rather are excluded entirely. If,
however, the plaintiffs proof satisfied the certainty rule, he receives
the entire amount demanded, despite the size of the sum or linger-
ing doubts as to whether the plaintiff actually would have earned
the entire sum. 9 This all-or-nothing characteristic has led a number
of commentators to criticize the rule. 0 The approach proposed in
this Article provides an appealing alternative which avoids this all-
or-nothing characteristic, permitting a compromise between these
extremes, and limits damages in a precise and appropriate way.7'
68. See MCCORMICK, supra note 27, at 105; Breach of Contract Remedies, supra note 59,
at 1212-13. Farnsworth has susggested that "limitation of damages to those that are foresee-
able and certain can be viewed as reducing the risk undertaken by entrepreneurs in a system
of free enterprise." Breach of Contract Remedies, supra note 59, at 1216; accord, McCORMICK,
supra note 27, at 567. In practice, however, the certainty rule may have the effect of increasing
the riskiness of a business enterprises. The enterprise will have to bear the losses from illegal
conduct if its potential profits are not sufficiently certain. In particular, the riskiness of a new
business is increased when "new businesses" are precluded from recovery of lost profits from
a wrongdoer. See notes 33-34 supra & accompanying text. Limiting the legal protection
available to a new business imposes an artificial handicap on a kind of risk-taking that may
be especially important to the economy. Cf. Domar & Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxa-
tion and Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. (1944), reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
TAXATION (R. Musgrave & C. Shoup ed. 1959) (valuable risk-taking is likely to be discouraged
by a tax policy that allows the deduction of losses only by companies with prior earnings).
69. Courts in contract cases may find a compromise outcome by awarding damages based
on plaintiff's expenses in reliance on the contract. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 373-77 (1937). Awarding expectancy damages
explicitly discounted for uncertainty, as recommended in this Article, is more likely to serve
the policies underlying the award of expectancy damages in contract cases than awarding
reliance damages because the plaintiff's expenses are correlated only imperfectly with the
economic value of his lost expectancy.
The certainty rule also may operate to limit the plaintiff's damages rather than simply to
deny them altogether if the plaintiff is able to satisfy the rule by showing lost earnings on
the basis of a past record but is precluded from showing an expected increase in earnings.
Even in this case, however, the plaintiff is denied any recovery for the opportunity for in-
creased earnings, even though that opportunity has a value.
70. MCCORMICK, supra note 27, at 119 (giving all or nothing "seems to result in oscillation
between overlavishness and niggardliness"); Breach of Contract Remedies, supra note 59, at
1214-15 (if alternative lesser measure of damages is not available, the certainty rule imposes
"the Draconian choice of all or nothing;" "it is hard to defend a requirement that attempts
to cope with the necessity for speculation by denying recovery altogether rather than by
resorting to reasonable approximation"); Lost Profits, supra note 31, at 1017, 1020, 1024.
71. Discussing the new business rule in contract cases, a recent student Note calls for a
compromise to permit some recovery by a plaintiff while avoiding an unduly large verdict.
New Business Rule, supra note 23, at 705, 729-33. One suggestion, id. at 730-31, that the
alternative earnings of plaintiff's freed capital in a riskless investment be deducted from
UNCERTAINTY AND DAMAGES
When the plaintiffs potential earnings are unceirtain, damages are
awarded, but the amount is reduced to the extent that the uncer-
tainty reduced the value of the potential earnings. The function of
the certainty rule in limiting damages is also served; a court con-
fronted with uncertain proof of damages need not permit the plain-
tiff to recover the full amount demanded but, instead, using well-
recognized financial tools, may make an appropriate adjustment for
the risk associated with the plaintiffs opportunity. Both undercom-
pensation and overcompensation are thus avoided.
PRECEDENT FOR DISCOUNTING FOR RISK
Discounting damages awards for risk would involve a modifica-
tion of current legal principles. Courts have sometimes responded
intuitively to uncertainty by reducing the amount awarded; use of
the techniques of financial analysis would yield a more principled
approach to uncertainty.
New York Cases Making an Allowance for the Riskiness of an
Occupation
The seminal opinion in a series of New York cases discounting for
risk was written by Judge Breitel in Grayson v. Irvmar Realty
Corp.72 The plaintiff was a twenty-one year old woman who had
been preparing for a career as an opera singer. The testimony indi-
cated that she had a superior voice and was preparing for a Euro-
pean debut. Injuries to the plaintiff, caused by the defendant's neg-
damages, seems to be required by the principle that plaintiff must minimize damage. Cf.
Vandervelde v. Put and Call Brokers and Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(deducting the interest in estimating plaintiffs damages). A second suggestion is that an
expected-value deduction be made, thereby dividing the risk of failure between the parties.
New Business Rule, supra note 23, at 731. The plaintiff, however, originally bore the riskiness
of its earnings possibilities, and the damage award should be calculated so that this risk is
not shifted to defendant. The Note also suggests a compromise basing the award on the
possible outcome most adverse to the plaintiff, "even though a plaintiff might legitimately
ask for damages based on the most likely outcome." Id. at 732-33. Awarding the expected
value, discounted for'risk, seems preferable to an award based on either the worst possible
outcome or the most likely outcome. For example, the worse possible outcome of an otherwise
very valuable opportunity might be a relatively improbable chance of zero income. An oppor-
tunity may be valuable even if there is a possibility of zero or negative income. Finally, the
Note suggests that in some circumstances "it is entirely defensible to arrive at some admit-
tedly arbitrary damage figure as a compromise." Id. at 733. Discounting for uncertainty, as
suggested in this Article, would not be arbitrary.
72. 7 App. Div. 2d 436, 184 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1959).
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ligence, included an impairment of pitch, thus limiting her perform-
ance. The jury was permitted to consider evidence as to her poten-
tial loss of earnings as an opera singer and awarded damages of
$50,000. The defendant appealed, questioning "whether there may
be [an award] where the probability of future earnings is not based
upon any prior actual engagement in the vocational earning of in-
come."
73
Identifying cases presenting similar difficulties of predicting a
plaintiff's earnings, for example, claims of pecuniary loss from the
wrongful death of children,74 Judge Breitel concluded that the op-
portunity to develop special talents "may have a pecuniary value
which is assessable, albeit without the degree of precision one would
require in a commercial case. '7"5 Thus, the defendant's contention
that no damages should be awarded for lost earnings because their
amount was too speculative was rejected. The jury's award of
$50,000, however, was excessive; unless the plaintiff accepted a re-
duced judgment of $20,000, a new trial was to be granted. 71
Judge Breitel's reasoning parallels in many respects the economic
analysis proposed in this Article by intuitively adjusting the damage
award to reflect uncertainty. The problem of valuing the plaintiff's
future earnings was identified. In contrast with other occupations
in which earnings of at least a median amount is highly probable, 77
opera singing involves a low probability of high earnings and a high
probability of low earnings. Thus, the jury could not assume that a
young opera student would earn even the income of an average
performer. Despite the high uncertainty regarding the amount of the
plaintiff's future earnings, however, her opportunity had some pecu-
niary value. 7 The court computed this value by reducing the
73. Id. at 437, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 34. The defendant's argument resembled that invoked
against the award of damages for loss of earnings in a new business. See notes 33-34 supra &
accompanying text.
74. There is less certainty in predicting the future earnings of one who has been trained
for a profession than in predicting earnings in an occupation such as concert musician,
professional athlete, or actor. In a profession, the probability of earning at least a medial
income is high, whereas for those with rare and special talents seeking to exploit them, "many
are called but few are chosen." In such an occupation there is a low probability of high
earnings and a high probability of low earnings.
75. 7 App. Div. 2d at 438, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
76. Id. at 440-41, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 37-38.
77. Judge Breitel's discussion is reminiscent of Milton Friedman's comparison of an actor's
career with a lottery. See note 45 supra.
78. 7 App. Div. 2d at 438, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
[Vol. 19:719
UNCERTAINTY AND DAMAGES
amount of damages otherwise appropriate. Judge Breitel, however,
failed to explain the method used in estimating an appropriate dis-
count for uncertainty. The allowance for risk made in comparable
economic situations was not discussed. It is not clear whether the
reduction made was an expected-value deduction or a discount for
uncertainty or both. Language in the opinion supports either inter-
pretation. References were made to the imprecision attending any
pecuniary valuation of plaintiff's opportunities, the future of a
would-be opera singer being described as "highly speculative."7
These observations would support a discount for uncertainty. By
contrast, the emphasis on the high probability of low income in such
a career would justify an expected-value deduction. Thus, both a
discount for uncertainty and an expected-value deduction would
have been appropriate. 0
Judge Breitel extended the Grayson analysis in Zaninovich v.
American Airlines, Inc.,'" in which expert testimony indicated that
the decedent's income would have increased significantly had he
survived. These potential earnings, Judge Breitel concluded, "must
be discounted, not only financially in determining present value of
future funds, but practically in recognizing that potentialities are
contingent and subject to unforeseen and unforeseeable vicissi-
tudes."8 As to sums which might otherwise have been inherited
from the decedent, the court suggested that: "[W]ith people as
young as those who died here, at the start of their careers, the
contingencies for the far future become extremely great and require
an all but total discounting of the suggested expectations." In view
of this uncertainty as to the decedent's future earnings, Judge Brei-
tel reduced the jury's $550,000 award for the death of the decedent-
husband to $350,000.
In Myers v. Town of Harrison,4 the Court of Appeals for the
79. Id. at 440, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
80. Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(applying Pennsylvania law), involved the potential earnings of another opera singer. Grayson
was distinguished on the ground that the evidence established that plaintiff would have
succeeded in becoming a recognized first-rank opera performer. Id. at 132. The court appar-
ently held that because success in opera would have been more likely than not, no deduction
or discounting of the award should be made to account for the risk that the plaintiff would
not have achieved high rewards. Id.
81. 26 App. Div. 2d 155, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1966).
82. Id. at -, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
83. Id. at -, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
84. 438 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Second Circuit, applying New York law, characterized Grayson and
Zaninovich as authorizing the discounting of damage awards
"because of the speculative and highly contingent nature of future
earning capacity many years hence."" Because the decedent was
studying for further technical degrees, the court found it
"reasonable to expect that he would move up with the company,
although any estimate of his expected lifetime earnings is obviously
highly speculative."8 Because the evidence and the instructions
failed to provide a sufficient basis for determining how the award
was computed or what elements were considered, the court declined
to rule on whether the jury award of $481,250 was excessive. Sample
calculations involving plausible discounting for risk suggest that the
jury's award overcompensated the plaintiff. 7
This line of cases identifies various situations in which, notwith-
standing the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff's projected future
earnings were subject to substantial risk. Although recovery of dam-
ages for these lost earnings was permitted, their amount was re-
duced to reflect that risk. In making this reduction, the court con-
sidered the alternative paths that the plaintiff's career might have
taken and the resultant impact on his potential earnings; this is
analogous to the economic calculation of risk suggested in this Arti-
cle.
The choice of the appropriate factor by which to reduce damages
seems to have been the result of intuition rather than reasoned
analysis. The use of discount factors corresponding to those applied
by the market to similar risks was not explored. These cases also fail
to recognize that some risk is always present in any damage calcula-
85. Id. at 298.
86. Id.
87. Make four assumptions favorable to the plaintiff. (1) The plaintiff would have earned
$25,000 per year, beginning in 1964. (In fact, the evidence did not suggest that he would have
received more than $15,000 by the time of the trial in 1969.) (2) Assume his earnings would
have gone on forever, so that a shortcut multiplication calculation can be made. See note 145
infra. (In fact, decedent's life expectancy in September, 1963 was 41 years. 438 F.2d at 298.)
(3) Assume that $100,000 is awarded for loss of care and guidance. Compare the trial court's
instruction, id. at 299 n.2 with Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 26 App. Div.2d 155,
271 N.Y.S.2d 866, 874 (1966). (4) Assume that a discount rate of 10% is used, with a risk
premium similar to those used for corporate bonds.
With these four assumptions, the projected earnings of $25,000 can be multiplied by 10 to
yield $250,000 as the present value of the total earnings of the decedent. If $100,000 is added
for loss of companionship, a sum of $350,000 results. The jury award of $481,250 clearly was
excessive.
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tion and that the same considerations of fairness and efficiency that
call for extensive discounting in cases of high risk support moderate
discounting in cases in which earnings were only moderately risky.
Moreover, the principle applied by the courts does not seem to have
been extended beyond tort cases to other cases in which the plain-
tiff's uncertain earnings opportunity obviously had some economic
value, albeit less than it would have been if receipt of future earn-
ings were certain. Finally, the precise basis for the courts' discount-
ing is ambiguous: either an expected-value deduction or a true dis-
counting for risk may have been made.
Other American Cases Allowing for Uncertainty
A few American cases in jurisdictions other than New York have
made adjustments in the amount of damages awarded because of
uncertainty as to the amount of the plaintiffs earnings absent the
defendant's wrongdoing. These cases often failed to discuss any
authority supporting the adjustment or to explain why the adjust-
ment was made. In some of these cases, the courts apparently in-
tended to make an expected-value deduction rather than a dis-
count for uncertainty.
In personal injury cases, courts routinely estimate damages with
reference to the injured person's life expectancy or working-life ex-
pectancy 5 An expected-value adjustment is implicit in this proce-
dure, and frequently may be made by taking a "middle" or
"typical" figure whenever the factfinder must estimate the duration
of an income stream. Similarly, Louisiana appellate courts have
taken into account the contingency of periodic unemployment in
making final determinations of damages. 9 In one case, the magni-
tude of the allowance suggests that it could not merely be an ex-
pected-value deduction but could only be justified by a further
discount for uncertainty."
88. See note 19 supra & accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, -, 245 So. 2d 151, 154-57 (1971)
(trial court erred in denying recovery for loss of earnings where corroborative evidence such
.as income tax returns was not produced by the plaintiff; a carpenter with five more years of
working-life expectancy at $100 per week was awarded $10,000 by the Louisiana Supreme
Court because construction work was not steady throughout the year, interruptions occurred
because of labor disputes, and there were intervals between jobs on various construction
projects).
90. In Fontenot v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 170 So. 2d 513, 515 (Ct. of App. 1965), the
appellate court reduced the award for lost earnings from approximately $14,500 to approxi-
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In Jordan v. Bero,9" the issue was whether the ten-year-old plain-
tiff's future pain and suffering, future medical costs, and future
earnings could be calculated by the jury with reasonable certainty.
The boy had suffered a brain injury and, according to the testimony,
had approximately a fifty-one percent chance of suffering future
headaches. The court held that the evidence supported an award of
$20,000, but was insufficient to support an award of $6,000 to the
father for future medical costs and his interest in his son's earnings.
Justice Neely, concurring, suggested that instead of using a
"reasonable certainty" standard in this kind of case, "a person...
confronted with a ten percent, fifteen percent, or twenty percent
probability (in the mathematical sense) that he will suffer future
injuries should be [permitted] to recover for those future injuries
at least in proportion to the probability of such injuries occurring. '92
This suggestion resembles the discount-for-uncertainty approach
suggested in this Article, although it is confined to a narrow class
of cases and suggests only an expected-value deduction."
Allowances for uncertainty in a commercial context Were made in
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc.94 The plaintiff, a minority shareholder,
brought a derivative and personal action alleging, in part, that some
of the defendants had tortiously interfered with his contractual right
of first refusal to purchase, from the majority shareholders, stock
sufficient to give him a controlling interest in the corporation. The
plaintiff personally claimed damages for the value of the lost stock
and for lost wages and bonuses that, because of his anticipated
controlling interest in the company, he may have directed to him-
self.
mately $5,000, because the plaintiff had not produced evidence that would tend to show the
extent to which work would have been available. Unless work would have been available only
about one-third of the time, this was equivalent to a discount for the uncertainty of the
plaintiff's employment. An adverse inference from the plaintiff's failure to produce evidence
as to the availability of employment should not be sufficient to support a conclusion that the
plaintiff had only a one-third probability of getting work. The extent of the discount might
be at least in part a penalty for the plaintiff's failure to produce the needed evidence. See
Martin Motor Sales v. Saab Scania of America, Inc., [1978-11 Trade Cas. T 61,907 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), discussed at note 110 infra.
91. 210 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1974).
92. Id. at 640-41 (Neely, J., concurring).
93. A student Note endorsed Justice Neely's suggestion and proposed some generalizations,
none of which, however, extends to the general problems of uncertainty in damages. See Note,
Awarding Damages for Permanent Injuries: A Proposal to Eliminate the Unreasonableness
of "Reasonable Certainty" in Jordan v. Bero, 4 HoFsTRA L. Rav. 101, 109-10, 112-14 (1975).
94. 378 F. Supp. 869, 880-81 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affl'd, 535 F.2d 982, 990-91 (7th Cir. 1976).
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The trial court found that some of the defendants had wrongfully
induced the majority shareholders to sell their stock, previously
committed to the plaintiff, to them, and agreed to hold the sellers
harmless for any suit that may be brought by the plaintiff. In esti-
mating the value of the stock lost by the plaintiff, the court focused
upon the price paid by the defendants, including the value of the
indemnity agreement given by the defendants to the sellers. Al-
though the defendant's counsel, in a letter to the defendant's credi-
tors, had estimated the maximum exposure under this agreement
to be $180,000, subject to mitigation by the plaintiff, the trial judge
found that the fair value of the agreement was $100,000, rather than
the $180,000 maximum, because the obligation was contingent upon
suit by the plaintiff and was subject to mitigation. The judge failed
to explain, however, how the adjustment for risk was calculated."
Affirming this portion of the award, the Seventh Circuit commented
in cursory fashion that "[t]he court below appropriately dis-
counted that figure . . .-.
Regarding the plaintiff's claim for lost wages and bonuses, the
court found that the plaintiff's projections of the company's earn-
ings, upon which these bonuses were contingent, were
"unrealistically optimistic," especially in view of "somewhat check-
ered history" of the company." These projections were based on
sales growth in new markets in which the profitability was ex-
tremely speculative; "any number of unforeseen circumstances
might have prevented [plaintiffs] bright hopes from becoming a
reality." 8 This uncertainty, however, did not entirely preclude re-
covery; the court found that an annual bonus of $15,000, more than
twice plaintiff's average for the previous five years, was a fair ap-
proximation, given the history of the company and its chances for
continuing profitability." This figure appears to be the result of an
expected-value deduction, with little discounting for the substan-
tial riskiness of the projected growth in earnings. Again, however,
the court failed to articulate the reasons for selecting $15,000. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that a trial court had "wide
latitude" in fixing damages and that the estimate for lost bonuses
95. Id. at 880.
96. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 990 (7th Cir. 1976).
97. 378 F. Supp. at 881.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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was supported by the plaintiff's projections. '
The equivalent of an expected-value deduction also may have
been made by the trial court in Riley v. General Mills, Inc.'", The
plaintiffs, insurance agents, had contracted for a promotional cam-
paign whereby an application for a $1000 school-child accident and
health policy was to be inserted between two packages of ginger-
bread mix marketed by the defendant. The promotion, backed by
an extensive advertising program, was intended to augment the
sales of the gingerbread mix. When the defendant breached the
contract by discontinuing the promotion after only a few months,
the plaintiffs based their claim for lost profits on a guaranteed com-
mission of a percentage on the annual net premium and a contin-
gent commission of a certain percentage on the insurance company's
profits.0 2 The guaranteed commission depended on the purchasers'
response rate, estimated by the plaintiffs to be between sixty and
ninety percent and by defendant's experts to be only one percent.
The trial judge, rejecting both of these estimates, criticized the
defendant's one percent estimate as "incredible" in view of the
advertising that was to have backed the promotion. Such a response
ratio would have meant a loss for the plaintiffs, something the judge
apparently thought unlikely given the plaintiffs' willingness to
undertake the project. The plaintiffs' estimate, however, was too
high; it was based on experience with school-child accident pro-
grams with different characteristics, and, moreover, the ginger-
bread mix was a slow seller. The judge concluded that public re-
sponse would have been twenty-five percent 0 3 and characterized
this prediction as a "reasonable approximation."'104
This characterization suggests that the court may have made an
expected-value deduction, striking a balance among the various
possible outcomes. It appears unlikely, however, that the twenty-
five percent figure chosen by the court included a discount for risk.
That substantial risk attended the promotion was indicated by the
100. 535 F.2d at 991.
101. 226 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
102. Finding-of-Fact 5 suggests that the insurance company's profits were computed ac-
cording to a specified formula, so that this may have been in effect simply an additional
commission on the annual premium. See id. at 781. The court, however, treated this com-
mission as contingent on the actual profits of the insurance company. Id. at 785.
103. Id. at 784.
104. Id.
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range of predictions made in the testimony of experts in the field of
school-child accident insurance." 5 Moreover, the court pointed to
the uniqueness of the campaign in rejecting as speculative the plain-
tiffs' claim for contingent commissions based on the insurer's prof-
its.
The Ninth Circuit apparently adopted the approach advocated in
this Article in Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc.' The district court
found the defendants liable on one of several antitrust counts al-
leged by the plaintiffs, but refused to award damages, because any
award based on the evidence offered by the plaintiffs would be
speculative. The Ninth Circuit, by a divided panel, remanded the
damages issue as to some of the plaintiffs. 7 The majority noted that
certainty in the proof of damages is no longer required in antitrust
litigation 8 and concluded, without citing any precedent, that "lack
of certainty justifies scaling down the award but not total rejec-
tion."'' Recovery was permitted notwithstanding the uncertainty as
to the amount of the plaintiffs' lost earnings; the amount awarded,
however, was to be reduced because of that uncertainty. The adjust-
ment called for by the court of appeals corresponds to the uncer-
tainty discount advocated in this Article, although the court gave
no guidance to the district court concerning the proper method for
calculating the amount of the discount. By adopting as the measure
of the discount the rate that the market would attach to a similarly
uncertain income stream, a desirable degree of predictability would
be fostered."0
105. Id.
106. 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976).
107. Id. at 812, 813.
108. See note 61 supra & accompanying text.
109. 548 F.2d at 812-13.
110. The approach recommended in this Article also was adopted in a recent decision
under the Automotive Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1970). In Martin
Motor Sales, Inc. v. Saab Scania of America, Inc., [1978-1] Trade Cas. 61,907 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), Judge Motley made 25% and 50% discounts in estimates offered by the plaintiff to
support its damage claims because the evidence supporting the estimates was either incom-
plete or absent, notwithstanding that such evidence had been available in plaintiff's business
records. Noting precedent for denying all recovery on the ground that any estimate under
these circumstances was necessarily speculative, the court chose instead to discount the
plaintiff's estimates; at one point it described the discounting as arriving at an "understated"
profit figure. Id. at 73,815 n.10. The inadequacy of the evidence compounded the uncertainty
of future profits present in any Dealers' Day in Court case, caused by the vagaries of business,
fluctuations in the economy, and doubt as to the franchise's future in the absence of the
manufacturer's bad faith. In using three and five year averages for the number of cars of the
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Factfinder Discretion to Allow for Uncertainty
Frequently, courts have stated that the factfinder has considera-
ble discretion in assessing damages"' within reasonable limits." 2
This discretion frequently may be used to reduce damages in re-
sponse to uncertainty concerning the amount of the plaintiff's lost
earnings. In Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper
Co., "3 one of the leading cases permitting recovery despite uncer-
tainty as to the amount of damages, the court emphasized that the
factfinder may respond to this uncertainty by making a reasonable
and probable estimate.
Occasionally, courts imply that a factfinder may, or even must,
take into account the contingencies regarding the plaintiffs lost
earnings when awarding damages." 4 Thus, the defendant may argue
defendant's brand sold and the average gross profit for each car sold, the court accounted for
yearly fluctuations in the plaintiff's business by an adjustment resembling an expected-
value calculation. The discounts of 25% and 50% apparently were intended more to allow for
uncertainty than to obtain estimates of the expected value. The plaintiff's estimates were
risky, but probably were neither 33% nor 100% too high, as would be true if the correct
expected value deduction were respectively 25% or 50%. For example, the plaintiff contended
that the profit rate on additives was 45%, which was the profit rate for parts. The courts
discounted this estimate by half, to 22.5%; yet the court probably did not mean to conclude
that the profit rate was as likely to be 0% as it was to be 45%. The court discounted the
plaintiff's estimates for 1973, the first year after the defendant's wrongful act, and for subse-
quent years. Discounting for uncertainty is appropriate for earnings estimated to have been
lost prior to trial as well as for earnings expected to have been received in the future. See
note 21 supra. In general, the court's approach to an uncertain damages situation, awarding
more than zero damages but discounting for that certainty, fits well with the thesis advocated
in this Article.
111. See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 511 F.2d 101, 106 (5th Cir. 1975).
112. Channell v. Anthony, 58 Cal. App. 3d 290, 317, 129 Cal. Rptr. 704, 722 (1976).
113. 282 U.S. 555, 562-67 (1931). The hope that the damages awarded despite great uncer-
tainty will involve some kind of compromise was expressed in a per curiam opinion by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: "[the award of damages in a wrongful-death case
is] of necessity a speculation . . . yet we do not for that reason turn the plaintiff out of court;
rather we subject the defendant to a decision which, though really without foundation as to
its amounts, is the best compromise we can reach. . . to avoid a result which of all possible
results is sure to be wrong." Piczonka v. Pullman Co., 102 F.2d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1939). The
language may be attributable to Judge Learned Hand, who sat on that panel. He cited the
opinion in expressing similar thoughts three months later in a plagiarism case, Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1939).
114. But see Lakota Girl Scout Council v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519
F.2d 634, 644-45 (8th Cir. 1975) (Bright, J., dissenting). Judge Bright argued that the plain-
tiff's proof of lost profits was too speculative, and objected to the jury's award of $35,000 on
the ground that it was inconsistent with the evidence, which, if believed, would have sup-
ported an award of at least $96,000. The possibility that the jury diminished its award to
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the uncertainty of the plaintiffs income to the jury," 5 and some
plaintiffs arguments have been held to be prejudicial error because
they might have misled the jury into regarding the plaintiff's receipt
of the earnings as certain. ' Appellate courts in these cases, how-
ever, seem to have contemplated that the factf'mder would make an
expected-value deduction rather than a discount for uncertainty.' 7
On at least one occasion a trial court has stated explicitly that it
reduced a damage award because of the uncertainty surrounding the
amount which the plaintiff would have received; this was affirmed
on appeal as within the trial court's discretion."8 Suit had been
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries caused by a
government-owned bus. The plaintiff, a policeman, contended that
the present value of his lost earnings, from the date of his involun-
tary retirement because of the injuries to the date on which he would
have been subject to mandatory retirement, was $91,000."1 As one
of two alternative grounds for awarding the plaintiff only $20,000,
the trial court concluded that the $91,000 figure was too speculative
because it did not allow for "possible trials and tribulations of life
and .. .unforeseen exigencies and circumstances.' 2' On appeal,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held this to be
reflect the great uncertainty was not considered. As to the difficulty of determining the basis
for a jury's award, see notes 127 & 128 infra & accompanying text.
115. Minch v. Local Union No. 370, 265 P.2d 286, 292 (Wash. 1953) (trial court has discre-
tion to permit defendants to use a blackboard to demonstrate a possible reduction in plain-
tiff's yearly earnings based upon evidence implying that employment opportunities in the
area were less than maximum during the period involved).
116. See, e.g., Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466,, _ 341 A.2d 613, 622 (1975)
(error to introduce tables prepared by an expert witness purporting to show the plaintiff's
aggregate damages because, along with other incorrect assumptions, the tables assumed
that a lapse in the decedent's earning capacity as a result of illness, incapacity, change of
jobs, layoffs or other causes of interruption would never occur); Cross v. Robert E. Lamb,
Inc., 60 N.J. Super. 53, -, 158 A.2d 359, 372-73 (A.D. 1960) (reversible error for plain-
tiff's counsel to write on the blackboard figures representing the plaintiff's loss of future
income which, among other weaknesses, "failed to allow for the almost inescapable statis-
tical probability that plaintiff would have lost some working time over the years by reasons
of vacations, lay-off time between job assignments, illnesses, strikes, and the other contin-
gencies of lost time which workmen on hourly employment are necessarily subject").
117. Judge Friendly, concurring dubitante in Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d
384, 393 (2d Cir. 1975), suggested that the trial judge should have taken into account possible
adverse contingencies, apparently through an expected-value deduction.
118. Bradshaw v. United States, 443 F.2d 759, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
119. The court noted that policemen could be retired before the date of mandatory retire-
ment at the discretion of the head of the police department. Id. at 771 n.26.
120. Id.
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proper; the trial court had discretion to take into account the riski-
ness of the future earnings. 12' Assuming that the $20,000 award in-
cluded the $9,000 for pain and suffering originally requested by the
plaintiff, only $11,000 was awarded for lost earnings. Contingencies
favorable to the plaintiff, such as the possibility that the plaintiff
might be able to find work in some capacity other than as a police-
man, indicated to the appellate court that an award of only $11,000
for lost earnings was not clearly erroneous.
Other appellate courts have upheld the factfinder's discretion to
reduce a damage award to allow for uncertainty. In Standefer v.
United States,2 2 a case under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
government introduced expert testimony that the plaintiff's injuries
might decrease his life expectancy by ten to fifteen percent, thus
reducing his expected medical expenses. The defendant argued that
the district court erred in using mortality tables that were not ad-
justed to account for this possibility. The Fifth Circuit held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the potential
reduction in medical expenses was counterbalanced by the contin-
gency that the estimated daily cost of medical care would be insuffi-
cient to cover any serious medical complications that might occur.
The permitted reduction probably reflected an expected-value ad-
justment rather than a discount for uncertainty. 12
In Frankel v. Heym, 12 the Third Circuit considered the uncer-
tainty of the plaintiffs future earnings in affirming an award of an
amount less than that indicated by the plaintiffs expert's testi-
mony, though such an adjustment was not made explicitly by the
trial judge in determining the damages. The plaintiff had com-
pleted, with outstanding success, two years of a four-year course in
commercial art. The trial court found it "convincingly demon-
strated" that she would have earned an average of $5000 a year as
a commercial artist for the period beginning two years after the
accident until the date of trial. The court also projected, however,
that, but for the accident, the plaintiff would have interrupted her
121. Id. at 771-72.
122. 511 F.2d 101, 106 (5th Cir. 1975).
123. It would have been unsound, however, for the trial court to conclude that the two
contingencies counterbalanced each other without satisfying itself that each was of similar
magnitude.
124. 466 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3d Cir. 1972), aff'g Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331,
1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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earnings to marry and bear children. Her earnings to age 65, thus
interrupted, were projected to be $125,000; when discounted under
the Pennsylvania rule at six percent simple interest, the award was
$62,000. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred
in not adhering to the expert testimony of an economist that the
plaintiff's probable future earnings, absent the disabling accident,
would have been $237,630. Judge Hastie noted, however, that this
testimony assumed that the injured woman would have been em-
ployed as a successful commercial artist continuously until normal
retirement age, contrary to the district court's finding that substan-
tial interruptions of gainful employment in order to have chiildren
would have occurred. He added that "the degree of success [the
injured woman] would have achieved in the career for which she
was preparing, but upon which she had not yet embarked, was an
additional uncertainty which the Court could properly take into
account."1'2
These cases indicate, however, that some American courts are
sensitive to the uncertainties attending prospective earnings and
either adjust or permit juries to adjust the damage award to reflect
these uncertainties. The frequency with which factfinders exercise
their discretion to reduce damages for uncertainty is difficult to
determine. Awards of less than the total amount claimed by the
plaintiff have been affirmed as permissible findings-of-fact. 2 1 It is
125. 466 F.2d at 1229.
126. Greene v. General Food Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 660-66 (5th Cir. 1975) (affirming the
admissibility of a damage expert's analysis of lost profits over a challenge that the evidence
was speculative, stating "significantly the jury awarded damages of only half the expert's
total estimate of approximately $150,000"); Laas v. Montana State Highway Comm'n, 483
P.2d 699, 703, 705 (Mont. 1971) (plaintiff claimed profits for three years in question to the
extent of $250,000, jury award of $78,000 affirmed despite a contention that the amount of
lost profits was speculative).
In Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. v. Gulf Naval Stores Co., 388 F.2d 302, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1968),
the defendant breached a contract to pay the plaintiff a commission on a large quantity of
sales of naval stores to foreign markets. The court found that the plaintiff had not presented
sufficient evidence to show what profits he had lost, especially his failure to show his expenses
as a sales agent. Rather than awarding only nominal damages, the court concluded that in
all reasonable probability some damages had been suffered and awarded $7,500 damages; the
plaintiff conteided that the damages were $263,503.81. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, pointing
out that an award of $7,500 on a claim of over one-quarter of a million dollars is little more
than nominal, and in any event "represents the considered judgment of the trial judge at
the termination of this protracted litigation and we are not disposed to disturb it." Id. at 304.
The award of $7,500 could be viewed as involving considerable discounting for risk in a
situation in which the plaintiff's failure to produce sufficient evidence had left great uncer-
tainty as to the extent of his lost profits.
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unclear, however, whether these reductions reflect a genuine allow-
ance for uncertainty or a disbelief by the jury of a portion of the
damages claimed,12 or simply a compromise among the jurors. 28
English and Canadian Cases Allowing for Contingencies
English Cases
Authority for reducing damage awards for risk in order to avoid
overcompensating the plaintiff also can be found in English law.
When compensating for the loss of periodic income payments, Eng-
lish courts explicitly allow for the "vicissitudes of life," such as
unemployment, injury, or early death. The method, which has been
described as "remarkably unscientific", 2 9 involves the application
of a multiplier to a multiplicand to determine the plaintiff's antici-
pated annual earnings. The multiplier takes into account the num-
ber of years during which earning power will have been lost, but is
reduced because a capital sum is received immediately and can be
invested to yield an appropriate annual income. This reduction cor-
responds to the American courts' reduction to present value. In
England, however, courts make a further adjustment for contingen-
cies. The multiplier, chosen from within conventional limits, de-
creases as the contingencies which might have prevented the plain-
tiff from receiving the projected income increase. 130
The calculations in Mitchell v. Mulholland (No. 2)13' illustrate the
use of multipliers. The plaintiff, thirty-six years old at the time of
trial, had been totally disabled; had he been able to work he would
have continued with his present employer for twenty-nine more
years, until age sixty-five. As a planning engineer, he formerly had
127. See Levi Strauss (Australia) Pty Ltd. v. Mayne Nickless Ltd. (N.S.W. Ct. App. 1976),
summarized in 51 AusTL. L.J. 211, 212 (1977), in which one judge concluded that the trial
court could have found that the plaintiff would have been able to get a refund of half the
purchase price from a third person if the defendant had carried out his contract to deliver
the returned goods in a reasonable time. See also Laas v. Montana State Highway Comm'n,
483 P.2d 699, 703 (Mont. 1971) (jury awarded $78,000 when the plaintiff sought $250,000, the
court stated "the jury agreed with [plaintiff] to the extent of $78,000").
128. See, e.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 1000
(1976) (in complicated cases an expert's testimony should be cleansed of unsupportable
assumptions or clear errors because of the difficulty in determining whether a jury verdict
that awarded less than the testimony called for is the result of effective cross-examination
on the area in question or of other factors).
129. ArnYAH, supra note 39, at 187.
130. See generally H. McGREGOR, McGREGOR ON DAMAGZs §§ 1100-1101, 1114 (13th ed.
1972).
131. [19711 2 All E.R. 1205.
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a substantial chance of being promoted to a position as a section
leader and a remote chance of further promotion. The annual in-
come of a planning engineer, including insurance and pension
rights, was £ 1325. This figure may have included an increment of
approximately fifty pounds to allow for the chance of promotion. 32
The judge adopted a multiplier of fourteen and awarded lost earn-
ings of £ 17,570, the product of the multiplier of fourteen and the
multiplicand of £ 1325.
The plaintiff contended that the determination of a lump sum to
be awarded in place of his lost earnings should be guided not by the
multiplier approach but by the actuarial and economic evidence he
introduced. This evidence, associated in England with the term
"actuarial approach," involved a calculation of the lump sum that,
appropriately invested in equity and fixed income securities, would
be required to insure the plaintiff's receipt of an annual income
equal to his greatest income. The plaintiff's experts conceded that
such contingencies as sickness or unemployment should be consid-
ered and for that purpose two percent was deducted in calculating
the lump sum recommended. The Court of Appeals, affirming the
award, unanimously criticized the actuarial approach, although one
judgment indicated that actuarial calculations might be useful as a
check for a judge when selecting the appropriate multiplier.lu
The judgments gave little explanation as to why the trial court's
choice of a multiplier of fourteen was acceptable, though one judg-
ment opined that the two percent discount for contingencies recom-
mended by the plaintiff's experts was "both haphazard and too
little.' ' 34 This lack of explanation evidences the importance to Eng-
lish trial judges of convention and custom in selecting a multi-
plier. 13 This typical rule-of-thumb approach in choosing multipliers
was described in dictum in Taylor v. O'Connor:131
There are two quite separate matters involved [in applying a
multiplier]-the present value of the series of future payments
and the discounting of the present value to allow for the fact that
for one reason or another the person receiving the damages might
132. Id. at 1210.
133. Id. at 1219 (Sir Gordon Willmer).
134. Id. at 1212 (Edmund Davies).
135. Judges, however, have discretion to modify the multiplier, but only to a modest
extent. Id. at 1218 (Widgery, L.J.).
136. [1971] A.C. 115, 128.
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never have enjoyed the whole of the benefit of the dependency.
It is quite unnecessary in the ordinary case to deal with these
matters separately. Judges and counsel have a wealth of experi-
ence which is an adequate guide to the selection of the multiplier
and any expert evidence is rightly discouraged.
Although there is little explanation as to how and why the English
courts calculate an allowance for contingencies, the allowance re-
sembles an expected-value deduction. Quoting from an Australian
case, 3 7 the court in Mitchell v. Mulholland (No. 2)138 described the
nature of the discount:
Allowances must be made for "contingencies" or the
"vicissitudes of life", as they are glibly called. But this ought not
to be done by ignoring the individual case in making some arbi-
trary subtraction . . . . Each case depends upon its own facts.
In some it may seem that the chance of good fortune might have
balanced or even outweighed the risk of bad. 3'
Although an expected-value deduction should not be made if
the favorable contingencies counterbalance the unfavorable con-
tingencies, a discount for risk is still appropriate; the existence of
unfavorable possibilities is undesirable notwithstanding any favor-
able contingencies, and a risk-averting public would discount the
price offered for any investment accompanied by such contingen-
cies.' Moreover, the English process has been described as multi-
plying the projected income by the probability that it will be
received."' Another commentator has attempted to measure the
average number of days lost per year from strikes, unemployment,
137. Bresatz v. Przibilla, [1962] 32 ALJR 212, 213.
138. [19711 2 All E.R. 1205, 1212.
139. In stating that the actuarial evidence provided for too small a discount for contingen-
cies, the court in Mitchell did not criticize the actuarial expert's use of an expected-value
deduction to allow for contingencies. 2 All E.R. at 1212. The views espoused in this expert's
testimony are presented in Prevett, Actuarial Assessment of Damages: The Thalidomide Case
-1, 35 MOD. L. Rev. 140, 150 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Thalidomide Case]. Arguably, in
criticizing the actuarial conclusion favoring an expected-value deduction of only two percent
for illness and unemployment, the court effectively made a discount for uncertainty. The
court, however, seems to have indicated that a larger deduction for expected value should be
made rather than that the uncertainties surrounding receipt of future income called for a
discount in addition to an expected-value deduction.
140. That an expected-value deduction is intended should not be obscured by courts'
references to "discounting" to account for contingencies. See, e.g., Taylor v. O'Connor,
119711 A.C. 115, 128.
141. Kidner & Richards, Compensation to Defendants of Accident Victims, 84 ECON. J.
130, 134 (1974).
[Vol. 19:719
1978] UNCERTAINTY AND DAMAGES
sickness, and disability and to use that figure to calculate the frac-
tion of the risk-free lump sum which should be deducted to allow
for these contingencies.1 2 Clearly, this is an expected-value
deduction.
The expected-value deduction resulting from the English courts'
use of multipliers typically is quite modest.1 3 In Mitchell v. Mulhol-
land (No. 2), the multiplier of fourteen approved by the Court of
Appeals was applied to an annual income figure which apparently
included an upward adjustment for what was only "a fair chance"
of promotion. "' A multiplier of fourteen corresponds to a discount
rate of seven percent if the annual earnings were expected to con-
tinue in to perpetuity.4 5 A discount rate that included an appropri-
ate risk premium, reflecting such hazards as loss of employment and
other potential disabilities, would have been much higher.'
The relatively small size of the adjustment made for contingen-
cies may result from failure by the court or counsel to recognize all
142. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES Ch. 5, cited in ATIYAH, supra note 39, at 195;
Thalidomide Case, supra note 139.
143. Street, supra note 142, concluded that a reduction of two percent to six percent would
be appropriate and estimated that courts generally deduct more, perhaps about 10%. He did
not, however, consider uncertainties in estimating the level of the injured person's future
income.
144. [1971] 2 All E.R. 1205, 1210.
145. Because the earnings in Mitchell were expected to last only 39 years, the implicit
discount rate was somewhat smaller than seven percent. Use of a multiplier as a substitute
for discounting a stream of income that is not perpetual necessarily results in some over-
statement; for a stream of income expected to last for a brief period of years, the inaccuracy
can be substantial. A multiplier of 14 for a perpetual income stream is approximately equiva-
lent to a seven percent discount rate because discounting a perpetual stream by a discount
rate of R% is mathematically equivalent to multiplying the income stream by 100aR, accord-
ing to the mathematics of geometric series. See S. SALAs & E. HMLLE, CALcuLUS 488-89 (2d
ed. 1974).
Another way of estimating the discount rate implicit in the multiplier approach is the
following: the trial judge used a multiplier of 14; when applied to the annual earnings figure
acccepted as correct, £ 1,325, an award of £ 18,500 resulted. [1971] 2 All E.R. at 1221. The
judge also assumed that the plaintiff would have been employed for another 30 years, had it
not been for his injuries. The present value of one pound per year for 30 years, discounted at
six percent, is £ 13.8. See BRUDNEY & CHIREI.TEIN, supra note 2, at 37. Thus a multiplier of
14 is approximately equivalent to a discount rate of six percent. If a discount rate of 15% had
been used, the award would be £ 8,705.25, less than half that computed with a six percent
rate or a multiplier of 14.
Lord Widgery commented that the conventional multiplier used by the trial judge did not
lead to strikingly different results from those arrived at by the plaintiffs expert, who used a
discounting approach. The plaintiffs expert had used low discount rates. [1971] 2 All E.R.
at 1211, 1217.
146. Cf. notes 39-57 supra & accompanying text.
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the contingencies that may endanger the prospective earnings of an
individual. In Taylor v. O'Connor,'47 the damages included an esti-
mate of the value of support payments which the decedent would
have made to his wife. In the years preceding his death, the dece-
dent's share as a partner in an architecture firm had been £ 7281,
£ 9135, £ 11,295, £ 14,890, £ 16,848 and i 17,167. One of the dece-
dent's partners asserted that, according to the partnership's plans,
fee income would have doubled during the next ten years so that the
total gross income of the decedent for the twelve years prior to his
retirement would have been £ 265,000.' s The court agreed that,
during the twelve years prior to his retirement, the decedent's an-
nual gross earnings would have been £ 21,000,' " and this figure was
used in the court's subsequent calculations.'50
Despite the steady growth of income realized by the decedent in
the six years preceding his death, the prediction that his income
would have continued to grow to an average of £ 21,000 per year
during the next 12 years was uncertain. His partner's statement that
this income would have doubled may be questioned; not all plans
and goals of a firm are realized, and continued growth for any firm
is subject to risks and fluctuations. Nevertheless, Lord Reid stated
that "any discount for contingencies should be comparatively
small. 1 51 This failure to account for the contingency that earnings
might not grow as planned may be explained in part by the defense
counsel's concurrence with the plaintiff's estimation of the dece-
dent's future income, which recognized only the possibility of sick-
ness as a relevant contingency. Although the defendant's counsel
noted that the decedent might have left more to his daughter than
147. [19711 A.C. 109 (1970).
148. Id. at 117.
149. Id. at 127.
150. Id. Averaging high and low years leads to inaccuracies if discounting is appropriate,
because earnings in a more remote year are less valuable than earnings in a current year:
Since averaging transfers money from the years of high contributions to the
years of low contributions, it would have no affect on the award at all if all years
were treated alike. But it is the purpose of discounting present value to treat
different years differently; discounted . . . at 3 I.2 percent ... , a dollar which
would have been contributed at the time of the judgment is worth a dollar, one
which would have been contributed 10 years later is worth about 71 cents, and
one which would have been contributed 29 years later is worth only about 37
cents.
LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 278 (2d Cir. 1965).
151. [19711 A.C. at 128.
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to the plaintiff-wife, he failed to emphasize other relevant contin-
gencies to which the decedent's future income was subject.
Thus, in their approach to uncertainty, the English cases corre-
spond only partially to the approach recommended in this Article.
English courts take note of only some of the adverse contingencies
that usually accompany the prospects of future earnings, failing
particularly to consider the uncertainty of possible increases in po-
tential future income. Moreover, these courts seem to make only an
expected-value deduction, not a genuine risk discount of the sort
necessary in a market to make a risky investment attractive to a
risk-averse public.
Canadian Cases
Canadian courts make allowances for contingencies when award-
ing damages in torts cases, but in so doing follow an actuarial ap-
proach rather than the rule-of-thumb multiplier approach adopted
by the English courts.'5 2 Canadian courts permit actuarial evidence
and discuss probabilities, life expectancy, and discounting to pres-
ent value. Allowances for contingencies have ranged from ten per-
cent to thirty-seven percent.'53 Use of the actuarial approach has led
to much greater allowances for contingencies in Canadian than in
the English cases.'54
Although Canadian courts speak favorably of the actuarial ap-
proach, they often fail to explain how an allowance for contingencies
is calculated.'55 Similarly, although they recognize contingencies
such as ill health or unemployment,'56 Canadian courts frequently
fail to consider the uncertainty inherent in predicting what the in-
jured person's income would have been.'57 Some recent decisions,
152. Charles, Justice in Personal Injury Awards: The Continuing Search for Guidelines, in
STUDIES IN CANADIAN ToRT LAw 58-60 (L. Klar ed. 1977).
153. Id. at 59-60 & n.107.
154. See note 145 supra.
155. See, e.g., Keizer v. Hanna, 64 D.L.R.3d 193, 198-201 (Ont. Ct. App. 1975); White v.
Parkin, 46 D.L.R.3d 411, 419-20, 423 (B.C. 1974); Hawrigluk v. Hodgins, 29 D.L.R.3d 403,
407, 409-10 (Ont. Ct. App. 1972); Spurr v. Naugler, 50 D.L.R.3d 105, 113-15 (N.S.S. Ct. Trial
Div. 1974).
156. See, e.g., Jackson v. Millar, 59 D.L.R.3d 246, 256-57 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1975).
157. Teno v. Arnold, 67 D.L.R.3d 9, 12, 26, 30 (Ont. Ct. App. 1976), involved brain-damage
injuries to a four-year-old plaintiff. Without these injuries, the court found, she would have
earned $10,000 per year, her mother's income, from age 19 to age 65. A five-percent discount
rate was used; discussion of contingencies included illness or disability from other sources,
but not the possibility that she would have earned less than her mother.
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In Keizer v. Hanna, 64 D.L.R.3d 193 (Ont. Ct. App. 1975), the decedent had been earning
about $10,000 per year, but the trial court accepted with "little doubt" the projection of the
decedent's foreman that those earnings would have risen to $13,500 within two years. Keizer
v. Hanna, 55 D.L.R.3d 171, 177 (Ont. Cty. Ct. 1975). The appellate court held that the trial
court erred in declining to make deductions for such contingencies as accident or illness on
the ground that they were unlikely to occur. 64 D.L.R.3d at 200. The court, however, did not
discuss the possibility than an increase in earnings to $13,500 might not have occurred. See
also White v. Parkin, 46 D.L.R.3d 411 (B.C. 1974), in which an actuary testified to the present
value of plaintiff's lost wages, assuming a four percent annual increase; the court held that
an allowance must be made for contingencies such as illness or unemployment, but did not
mention the contingency that wages might not grow at a rate of four percent. Id. at 419.
158. In Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., 64 D.L.R.3d 663 (Alta. 1975), leave to appeal
to Supreme Court of Canada on damages issues granted (April 1, 1976), the plaintiff's wages
had been $830 per month at the time of the accident. His foreman testified that he was a
good apprentice and that, before the accident, he had a very good chance for promotion to a
supervisory position, with earnings between $1,115 and $1,750 per month. The appellate court
reasoned that an assessment somewhere between the potential maximum of $1,750 and $830
would have been "realistic." Id. at 690-91. Thus, the trial judge should have assessed the
decedent's earnings at the "more realistic, albeit arbitrary, . . . figure of approximately
$1,200 per month" rather than $830 per month. Id. at 691. The trial judge's deduction of 20%
for contingencies was approved, although the appellate court's projection of a figure that
reflected the probabilities of promotion was riskier than that used by the trial judge. Simi-
larly, in Spurr v. Naugler, 50 D.L.R.3d 105, 107, 109, 113-14 (N.S.S. Ct. Trial Div. 1974),
the judge made an expected-value adjustment by increasing the assumed income of a dece-
dent whose salary probably would have increased. The possibility of receiving a higher or
lower salary was a contingency to be considered, although the selection of the allowance for
contingencies was not explained.
In Babineau v. MacDonald (No.2), 59 D.L.R.3d 671, 674-77 (N.B. App. Div. 1975), the trial
judge based his calculation on testimony which assumed that the decedent, a traveling
salesman, would have received an earnings increase of seven percent per year; he reduced the
award by 35% because of various contingencies. The appellate court did not accept the
projection of seven percent yearly but used a figure for pecuniary benefits available to depen-
dents that was 20% higher than the decedent's contributions at the time of death. Use of a
more conservative figure for earnings growth reduced the risk that the decedent's earnings
were overestimated; the appellate court did not discuss this fact, but its allowance for contin-
gencies was approximately 15,000 or only about 16%.
95,000
In Willey v. Cambridge Leasehold Ltd., 57 D.L.R.3d 550, 563-71 (P.E.I. 1975), the court's
attention was drawn to the uncertainty of the decedent's future income because the uncer-
tainty was dramatically high. Decedent was a retired professor of education with a pension.
He had been working for the University of Prince Edward Island at a salary of $10,000 per
year for one year; testimony showed that he probably would have been retained for further
years and perhaps would have taught in summer school, with a maximum salary of $12,000.
The trial court applied a higher multiplier to the pension figure than to the outside earnings
as a university teacher because the latter was much more uncertain. The trial court reasoned
that the extra income was potentially $12,000 and that it was possible for the decedent to
earn such extra income for a period of 12 more years. It adjusted for uncertainty by treating
his income as averaging $6000 over a period of 8 years. The appellate court made a further
reduction and assumed that the extra earnings would last for five years. With these adjust-
ments capitalization took place at an interest rate of six percent per year.
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however, have made explicit or implicit allowance for this major
source of uncertainty,158 though they are indications that only an
expected-value deduction was intended.'59
Value-of-the- Chance Cases
In the "value-of-the-chance" category of cases, recovery of dam-
ages is permitted although the proof fails to establish that the plain-
tiff had a greater-than-even chance of having any earnings. The
classic example is an English case, Chaplin v. Hicks. 60 The defen-
dant, a theater manager, was to choose twelve prize-winners from
159. Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., 64 D.L.R.3d 663, 690-91 (Atla. App. Div. 1975),
leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada on damages issues granted (April 1, 1976)
(uncertainty as to the decedent's future income accounted for by use of a figure less than the
projected maximum but more than earnings at time of death); Thornton v. Board of School
Trustees, 57 D.L.R.3d 438, 462-63 (B.C. 1975) (possible beneficial contingencies, such as
salary increases, had been equal in likelihood to adverse contingencies, such as unemploy-
ment or alcoholism, so no deduction was made for contingencies); Keizer v. Hanna, 64
D.L.R.3d 193, 200 (Ont. Ct. of App. 1975) (reductions from the maximum possible damages
must be based on the probability of each adverse contingency).
The difference between the Canadian approach to uncertainty and the discount-rate proce-
dure recommended in this Article is illustrated in Haley v. Richardson, 60 D.L.R.3d 480 (N.B.
1975). The trial court based its determination of the decedent's prospective contribution to
his dependent's support on projected future earnings, using as its basis the decedent's average
earnings for the three years preceding his death. The appellate court revised this estimated
annual contribution figure to $6000. The appellate court also concluded that the decedent
would have been employed for an additional 16 years, and discounted the annual contribu-
tion, at $6000 for 16 years, by six percent, yielding a present value of $60,635. To account for
contingencies, such as ill health, accident or business competition, or the possibility that the
decedent's wife would remarry, the appellate court deducted an additional $10,000 from this
estimate, a reduction of almost 17 percent. In contrast, use of a risk premium of nine percent,
added to the six percent present-value discount applied by the court, would have yielded a
total discount of 15 percent, or a total present value, for $6000 earned over 16 years, of $35,760.
Thus, the expected-value deduction typically made by the Canadian courts may result in
an ultimate figure much higher than the value of a similar opportunity if it were sold on a
hypothetical market.
160. [1911] 2 K.B. 786. Simple calculations indicate that, on the assumption that each
contestant had a chance of about one-in-four, the jury in Chaplin v. Hicks seems to have
made a discount for uncertainty. The award of £ 100 was less than the expected value of the
prize that plaintiff would have received on the assumption that her chances were as good as
those of the other 49 contestants. Of those prizes, one-third consisted of employment for wages
of £ 260 per year for three years, one-third consisted of wages of £ 200 per year for three years,
and one-third consisted of,£ 156 per year for three years. Thus, the expected value of the prize
was £ 208 per year, for three years. With a one-in-four chance of winning a prize, the plain-
tiff's expected gain was £ 52 per year for three years. Only with a discount rate over 20% would
this sum fail to be more than £ 100. See the tables in BRUDNEY & CHmLSTEIN, supra note 2,
at 37. Thus, the jury in effect applied a discount rate with a substantial risk premium to the
plaintiff's expected gains.
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among fifty finalists in a beauty contest. The plaintiff was among
the fifty finalists. The prize for each of the twelve winners was to
be theatrical employment for three years. The first four were to be
paid five pounds per week; the second four, four pounds per week;
and the last four, three pounds per week. The defendant was held
liable for breach of contract for failing to notify the plaintiff to be
present for the final judging. The jury valued the plaintiff's lost
opportunity at £ 100. The judgment was affirmed unanimously in
the Court of Appeals, despite the great uncertainty in assessing the
plaintiffs chance of victory and, therefore, her pecuniary loss. The
court reasoned that the average chance of each competitor was
about one in four. Although none of the fifty competitors could have
sold her opportunity, a jury might be able to value the opportunity
on the basis of the price which might have been paid for it in a
hypothetical market.
The value-of-the-chance approach resembles that suggested in
this Article. If an opportunity to make profits has been lost, some
recovery should be permitted even if the gains are very uncertain.
Cases involving contests, applying both an expected-value deduc-
tion and a discount for uncertainty, may be generalized to support
an approach to damage law which recognizes that, although uncer-
tainty diminishes the value of an opportunity, it does not render it
worthless. '
One argument supporting such an extension to cases involving
lost profits compares a contest to a potential sale by a business.
Repeated sales efforts should lead to a predictable number of sales
even if many attempted sales are unsuccessful.'6 2 A second argu-
ment is that the opportunity to make profits may have a market
value on which an award of damages may be based.'63 This argu-
ment was adopted by the court in Chaplin, though the market re-
161. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 155-57 (limiting the approach to cases in which one can
assign "capital value by reason of profits that would result with reasonable certainty from
the value of the chance," id. at 156); McCoRMICK, supra note 27, at 117-19, 123 (limiting the
approach to situations in which the amount of the potential prize is fixed). But see
MCGREGOR, supra note 130, at §§ 254, 266-71 (suggesting considerable scope in the United
Kingdom for the value-of-the-chance approach).
162. MCCORMICK, supra note 27, at 118-19. The argument seems to correspond to what
probabilists know as the law of large numbers. With repeated trials of a risky opportunity,
the average number of successes should correspond very closely to the expected value of the
outcome of one trial. See 1 W. FELLER, AN INTRODUCION TO PROBABILrrY THEORY AND rrs
APPLICATIONS 243 (3d ed. 1968).
163. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 156.
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ferred to by the court, and thus the market value of the contestant's
opportunity, was hypothetical only. Any risky opportunity has at
least a hypothetical market value that can be established not only
by evidence as to what buyers and sellers actually have paid for
similar opportunities but by rough projections based on what buyers
and sellers pay for earning prospects subject to similar risks.
Courts and commentators, however, have been cautious in ex-
tending the value-of-the-chance approach to non-contest situations.
This reluctance remains despite the fact that the value-of-the-
chance approach prevents undercompensation by allowing a plain-
tiff to recover though the amount of his losses is uncertain and
prevents overcompensation by awarding a plaintiff less than the
most optimistic sums.
Commentators who have advocated the extension of the value-of-
the-chance approach have suggested that it be extended only to
limited classes of cases. Dobbs suggests that the approach be ex-
tended only to situations in which a market value can be established
for the lost opportunity." 4 McCormick has suggested limiting any
extension to cases in which there was either no chance of actual loss
by the plaintiff or the chance of success was greater than the chance
of loss.6 5 Limiting the value-of-the-chance approach also is pro-
posed in Section 332 of the Restatement of Contracts,' 6 which sug-
gests that the promisee should recover damages measured by the
value of his opportunity, but limits the principle to situations in
which performance by the promisor might never have occurred and
in which determining with reasonable certainty whether the per-
164. Id.
165. McCoRMICK, note 26 supra, at 120-23; cf. Sykes v. Midland Bank Ex'r and Trustee
Co., [1971] 1 Q.B. 113, 130 (no damages awarded when it was more probable than not
that the plaintiffs would have failed to take advantage of the opportunity they would have
had if defendant-solicitor had given them the correct advice). Such a restriction is arbitrary.
The possibility of a loss does not imply that an opportunity is not valuable, perhaps very
valuable. In fact, an opportunity in which the chance of success is very small may be quite
valuable if the prize is great. In the classic contest cases, such as Chaplin v. Hicks, the
probability of winning a prize is often less than 50%. In fact, if an entry fee has been paid,
such a contest could be viewed as one in which a loss will occur more than 50% of the time.
In many business opportunities, for example in.the exploration for oil, the probability of
success is less than the probability of failure, and yet the opportunity is viewed in the mar-
ket place as valuable. See C.J. GRAYSON, DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTANY: DR.MIG DECISIONS
BY OIL AND GAS OPERATORS 61, 103 n.25, 157, 160, 170, 251 (1960) (drilling often is under-
taken with chances of success less than one-half; for representative years, drilling of "new
field wildcats" has been successful much less than half the time).
166. RESTATEMENT oF'CONTRAcrs § 332 (1932).
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
formance by the promisor would have been required is impossible.
Yet, uncertainty as to whether the defendant's performance would
have been required does not differ in any significant way from other
uncertainties.
Courts are also reluctant to follow the value-of-the-chance ap-
proach of awarding less than the maximum amount that the plain-
tiff might have received to account for uncertainty regarding the
plaintiff's opportunity. For example, in Sykes v. Midland Bank
Executor and Trustee Co. Ltd., 117 both parties attempted to extend
the value-of-the-chance approach to the negligent failure of a solici-
tor to give correct advice as to the meaning of a clause in the plain-
tiffs' lease. It was uncertain whether the plaintiffs would have at-
tempted to obtain a reduction in the rent had they known of the
correct and disadvantageous construction of the clause. The defen-
dant urged that any damages awarded should be reduced to reflect
the chance that the plaintiffs would not have acted differently had
they been advised correctly. Upon appeal, the plaintiffs' counsel
relied on the value-of-the-chance approach, arguing that despite
this uncertainty some damages should be awarded to compensate
for the loss of the opportunity to negotiate with a correct under-
standing of the applicable law. English courts have been more will-
ing to extend the value-of-the-chance approach to non-contest cases
than American courts,' 8 albeit only in limited classes of cases.' 8
Lord Justice Salmon, in his judgment, was unwilling to award dam-
ages to the plaintiff; he thought it more probable than not that the
plaintiffs would have acted just as they did even with the correct
legal advice. He added that, if the plaintiffs had succeeded in estab-
lishing that they would have taken corrective action if given careful
167. [1971] 1 Q.B. 113, 130.
168. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, Damages 1935-1937, 61 HARV. L. REv. 113, 123
(1947). Although the statement is still correct, an exception is Lakota Girl Scout Council,
Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 640 (8th Cir. 1975), which
permitted recovery of lost profits despite uncertainty, citing a contest case, Wachtel v. Na-
tional Alfalfa Journal Co., 190 Iowa 1293, 176 N.W. 801 (1920). A number of non-contest Iowa
cases, however, also were cited to support recovery of lost profits if a reasonable approxima-
tion of the loss was possible. The jury exercised its discretion to award a sum considerably
less than the maximum amount supported by plaintiff's evidence. Cf. note 170 infra. The jury
may have made a reduction for the riskiness of the plaintiff's potential gains.
169. McGaREOR, supra note 130, at §§ 253, 264-71 (suggesting that the value-of-the-chance
approach is more often used in connection with "one-shot" opportunities, as when a solicitor
negligently handles a matter for a client, than when an opportunity to receive profits over a
period of time has been lost).
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advice, then no discount should be made, and an award equal to the
sum which it would have saved should be given. In effect, Lord
Justice Salmon concluded that the value-of-the-chance approach
should not be used to reduce damages because of uncertainty if the
plaintiff can establish that it would have received the sum in ques-
tion.7 0
A somewhat different distinction was made in a recent Australian
case. In Levi Strauss Pty. Ltd. v. Mayne Nickless Ltd., "I the defen-
dant had contracted with the plaintiff to return certain goods to the
vender within a reasonable time but failed to do so. The plaintiff
alleged that the vendor had agreed to refund the purchase price if
the goods were shipped within thirty days of their arrival in Aus-
tralia. The trial judge found that shipment within forty-five days
would have been within a reasonable time and that if the defendant
had shipped the goods within that period the vendor would in fact
have accepted them and would have refunded to the plaintiff half
the price. Although the appellate court held that the evidence sup-
ported the trial court's finding, the court noted that the award could
have been based alternatively on a conclusion that one half the
purchase price was equal to the value of the refund opportunity.' 2
The judgment added, however, that, if the trial court was satisfied
that the plaintiff definitely would have received a particular sum,
then no allowance for uncertainty should be made.7 3 Under this
170. A failure to adjust for uncertainty occurred in the jury award in an American contest
case. Jane Blalock brought a treble-damages suit against the Ladies Professional Golfers
Association, alleging that her disqualification from the 1972 Lady Carling tournament vio-
lated the antitrust laws. The plaintiff's expert, in an elaborate analysis, noted that in the
first nine tournaments in 1972 Blalock had finished on the average 7.9 strokes out of first
place. He concluded that the odds against her winning the Lady Carling tournament were
285 to 1 but that the odds were 23 to 1 that she would have won something and that there
was a better than even chance that she would have won at least $1,427.50. He also concluded
that she had about the same chance of winning the $4,500 first price money as any of her
nine principal rivals. The jury awarded $4,500.00, which was then trebled under the provi-
sions of the antitrust laws. The jury award thus exceeded the expected value of Blalock's
lost opportunity in that there was neither an expected-value deduction nor a discount for
risk. See Levy, Antitrust and the Links: Estimating a Tournament Golfer's Score, Interfaces
5, 7, 11, 14 (May, 1976). The district court decision is reported in Blalock v. Ladies Profes-
sional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
171. (N.S.W. Ct. App. 1976) (Mahoney, J.A.), summarized in 51 AusTL. L.J. 211 (1977).
172. Clearly the appellate court must have made only an expected-value deduction be-
cause an award of 50% of the purchase price can only take place, under the court's theory,
if the probability of receiving the purchase price was 50%. If the probability were greater
than 50%, the whole purchase price should have been awarded.
173. A commentator on the case points out that the standard English practice of making
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view, if a court is satisfied that it is more likely than not that a
specific sum probably would have been obtained but for the defen-
dant's wrongdoing, no deduction is to be made for uncertainty. If,
however, it is more likely than not that the sum would not have been
obtained, then the sum awarded is to be discounted to reflect this
uncertainty.
Apparently adopting a similar approach, Professor Dobbs de-
scribes the recovery of the market or contract value of the chance
as an alternative available to a plaintiff who is unable to satisfy the
certainty rule with regard to the profit he claims to have lost.
174 If
no discount for uncertainty is made in valuing lost profits when the
evidence satisfies the certainty rule, however, overcompensation
will take place, and the damages awarded for lost profits will exceed
the hypothetical market value of the opportunity to make those
profits.
That the principles underlying the value-of-the-chance approach
have broad applicability is demonstrated in Air Technology Corp.
v. General Electric Co.,175 in which it was uncertain whether the
defendant would ever have had to perform its contract. Although
the court specifically cited both Section 332 of the Restatement of
Contracts and Chaplin v. Hicks, 78 its broad language would be
applicable to any breach of contract that causes the plaintiff to lose
an opportunity for profit. Because the defendant failed to comply
with his agreement to subcontract with the plaintiff, the plaintiff
lost a valuable business opportunity with the Air Force. The court
held that, although damages could be determined with adequate
certainty on the basis of the value of that opportunity, 17 7 the plain-
tiff's last offer of terms to the defendant could not be viewed as the
adjustments for the vicissitudes of life in personal injury cases is inconsistent with the ap-
proach suggested by the court. Any distinction between the loss of a chance and the loss of
an identifiable thing seems illusory since the judge can find a fact to be established, such as
the "fact" that an identifiable thing would have been recovered, merely on the balance of
probability. Damages - Breach of Contract - Probabilities as to Events which have not
Occurred - Loss of a Chance - Event Foreseeable and Not Unlikely to Result, 51 AusTL. L.J.
211, 212 (1977). A finding that there was a 55% chance that a plaintiff would have received
$10,000 and a 45% chance that a plaintiff would have received nothing seems equivalent for
all practical purposes to a finding that a plaintiff had a 55% chance of receiving $10,000 and
a 45% chance of receiving nothing.
174. DOBBS, supra note 24, at 156.
175. 347 Mass. 613, 627-28, 199 N.E.2d 538, 548-49 (1964).
176. [1911] 2 K.B. 786; see note 160 supra & accompanying text.
177. 347 Mass. at 627-28, 199 N.E.2d at 549.
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ultimate terms of the parties' unfinalized contract. The defendant
might have bargained for better terms; moreover, the Air Force
might not have approved the subcontract. Therefore, an appropri-
ate measure of damages would have to reflect the fair value of the
plaintiff's opportunity, subject to these contingencies. This ap-
proach is consistent with that advocated in this Article.
VALUING BUSINESSES AND CONTRACTS
By envisioning the plaintiff's income opportunity as marketable,
a court will be better able to appreciate the logic of discounting for
uncertainty. Unless the court discounts for risk, the plaintiff will be
overcompensated if his lost earnings are assumed to be certain, and
he will be undercompensated if the opportunity is viewed as value-
less.
If the plaintiff's claim is for the destruction of or damage to a
business, courts often will discount the anticipated earnings at a
rate which includes a risk premium. '78 Discounting for risk comes
more naturally because businesses are sold frequently, and most
buyers, valuing a business for the earnings it can generate, regard
risk as one factor reducing the business' financial attractiveness.'79
This result is illustrated by the valuation in Vandervelde v. Put
and Call, Broker & Dealers Association,8 ' in which the court held
that even a business with uncertain earnings nevertheless has value,
though the business' value was discounted for risk. The court
178. Although Dobbs has suggested that the relaxation of the uncertainty approach to
damages in antitrust cases reflects the strength of the policies of the antitrust laws, DoBs,
supra note 24, at 152-53, it also may be due to the tendency towards phrasing antitrust claims
in terms of the destruction of a business rather than the loss of a businesi opportunity. The
standing requirement of § 4 of the Clayton Act, that the plaintiff must have been "injured
in this business or property." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), may be the cause of this choice of
language. Courts probably are more familiar with the use of capitalization-of-expected-
income techniques to value an enterprise than with the use of the same techniques to analyze
an investment opportunity.
179. [T]he discount rate applied [in valuing a business destroyed by an
antitrust violation] should vary according to the amount of confidence the trier
of fact has in the likelihood that the earnings level he has predicted actually
would have been maintained: a low rate to produce a higher award where the
business had a stable profit capacity; a high rate to minimize the damages where
the firm was less likely to produce a continuing return.
Note, Private Treble-Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damages for Destruction of All or
Part of a Business, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1566, 1577 (1967). Cf. Greenwold, Capitalized Pricing of
Injury to Capital in Treble Damage Suits, 45 CORNELL L. REV. 84, 85 (1959).
180. 344 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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pointed out that the plaintiff's "business [had] potential for profit
earnings, and the loss of that opportunity is the focus of
[plaintiff's] recovery."'' Damages were measured by the amount
a willing buyer might have paid the plaintiff for the capitalized
value of this earnings stream. The court applied a multiplier system
widely used by courts and financial analysts in valuing corpora-
tions,""2 which involves the use of lower multipliers for businesses
whose earnings are uncertain. The stability of an earnings stream,
the court emphasized, depends upon the economic outlook in gen-
eral, the prognosis of the specific industry involved, and the extent
to which the business in question might be expected to participate
in any future industry success. Under the valuation formula applied
by the court, an industrial business that depends on the special skill
of its manager in a highly competitive industry should be valued at
twice its earnings stream; personal service businesses requiring spe-
cial skill might be valued at only the value of a single year's earn-
ings.'8 In selecting a multiplier the court analyzed various weak-
nesses in the plaintiff's business that would have decreased its value
to a hypothetical buyer.8 4 Despite these uncertainties, the court
ultimately selected a relatively high multiplier by which to value
the plaintiff's lost business.' 5
A similar allowance for uncertainty was made in estimating the
salary that the plaintiff had lost as a result of the defendant's anti-
trust violation. The court observed that the plaintiff's salary varied
according to the financial condition of the business. Moreover,
estimation of the ultimate duration of the plaintiff's business was
difficult. The court therefore made an award of one year's average
salary, discounting more severely for uncertainty than in the case
of the corporation's profits.'88
Contracts can be sold as well as corporations. Comparison with
market transactions may permit recovery by a plaintiff, subject to
an allowance for uncertainty resembling the allowance that would
be made on the market.'87 Thus, reviewing a case involving an alle-
181. Id. at 145.
182. Id. at 150-53.
183. Id. at 151.
184. Id. at 151, 152.
185. Id. at 152.
186. Id. at 154.
187. See DOBaS, supra note 24, at 143 n.19; MCCORMICK, supra note 27, at 103-04.
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gation that the defendant's negligent burning of the plaintiff's bas-
ket factory prevented the performance of a contract to sell berry
crates for a fixed profit of $3500,18s the appellate court concluded
that recovery of lost profits from the contract should be permitted.
The court reasoned that the value of the contract would have been
considered by the plaintiffs in appraising an offer to buy their fac-
tory together with its outstanding contracts, but the risk of unsuc-
cessful performance by the plaintiffs would also have been consid-
ered in valuing the contract.' On remand the jury would be permit-
ted to assess damages at an amount lower than $3500 if the evidence
showed that contingencies, such as possible insolvency of the buyer,
rendered the contract less valuable. This valuation of the contrac-
tual opportunity closely resembles the value-of-the-chance ap-
proach discussed previously.' 0
Conclusion
Failure to make an expected-value deduction and a further dis-
count for uncertainty often overcompensates the plaintiff; damages
are awarded as though this opportunity had been risk-free and
therefore more valuable than it actually was. Courts, perhaps sen-
sing this result, have developed doctrines that may deny the plain-
tiff any recovery for his lost income opportunity. This is unsatisfac-
tory because it results in undercompensation. Widely used tools of
financial analysis are available to achieve more accurate valuation
of opportunities for future earnings and thus to avoid this all-or-
nothing dilemma. Although courts generally have failed to employ
these principles, a number of cases indicate judicial willingness to
adjust for uncertainty in valuing lost earnings.
188. A.F. Johnson & Son v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 140 N.C. 574, 576, 53 S.E. 362, 364
(1906).
189. Id. The court refused, however, to permit recovery for profits not covered by contracts,
pointing out that many contingencies, such as shifts in demand for crates, might cause profits
to be higher or lower than the best estimate of the factfinder. Because those contingencies
were regarded as significant, the court held that any estimate of lost profits would be specula-
tive. Id. at 580, 53 S.E. at 364. The possibility of discounting such an estimate for uncertainty
more sharply than the more certain estimate of profits obtainable under the contract was not
considered by the court.
190. See notes 40-60 supra & accompanying text.
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